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Preface
This is not just another of the many reports on
rural and remote telecommunications in Austra-
lia. It attempts to summarise the issues and point
to possible changes in a more direct way: and
without the usual circumlocution which a politi-
cally sensitive topic attracts. The purpose was
not to re-visit the usual arguments about the cost
of the universal service obligation, or the com-
parison between metropolitan areas and remote
areas. It simply aims to draw together clear
thinking about the issues, in the hope of a better
outcome for users and providers of
telecommunications.
Following the common practice used by Net-
work Insight, we first prepared a research paper,
then hosted a round table discussion by experts
from different viewpoints. The project was pos-
sible because Chris Dalton kindly agreed to give
Network Insight and the public the benefit of his
years of experience through the research paper.
In his previous role at Vodafone, he worked on
these difficult issues on a daily basis. He also
has the benefit of earlier experience at the De-
partment of Communications, and so he is aware
of both the carrier’s perspective and the
government perspective.
The credit for the research paper lies entirely
with Chris, but as with all Network Insight pro-
jects, this complete publication included input
from members of our team: Nico Roehrich,
Sarah Barns and Kirsten Harley. Each made an
editorial contribution to the pages which follow.
Each of the participants in the round table kindly
gave up their time to contribute to the discussion
and to revise the transcript. We are very grateful
to them also.
Mark Armstrong
St Leonards, Sydney
5 August 2002
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Part I – Issues and directions
This paper deals with the current state of tele-
communications services for rural and remote
Australia. For simplicity, we use the word
‘rural’ to include rural and remote. The paper
differs from the usual official reports on this
much-debated topic, by aiming at the core of the
issues. We do this through three mechanisms:
• this brief summary of the issues
• the record of a round-table discussion of
experts
• the research paper by Chris Dalton.
The purpose is to cut through the rhetoric, and to
get straight to practical answers about how to
meet the reasonable needs of rural telecommuni-
cations users within the next five years. It is dif-
ficult to look ahead, because the players and
policy makers are locked into an existing regu-
latory game, and the politicians are locked into a
pork-barrelling exercise. This limits the ability
of the official public process to offer fresh ap-
proaches, or to make realistic trade-offs which
might require that the whole scheme be changed.
The state of play
For the last 10 years, we have seen an abun-
dance of policy, money and attention devoted to
rural telecommunications, but consumer disap-
pointment about the results. There seems to be a
consensus that the problem continues. Rural
telecommunications produces an annual revenue
of around $825m per year, less than five per cent
of the total Australian market. Yet the topic oc-
cupied 33 per cent of all media releases by the
Minister for Communications and the Arts in the
three years following the federal election in
1998. So here is an issue demanding political
attention out of all proportion to its size.
The issue consumes an increasing amount of
government spending. From 1991 to 1996, no
Commonwealth funds were specifically allo-
cated to rural telecommunications initiatives.
For the five years from 1997 to mid-2002,
$819m was allocated through schemes such as
Networking the Nation. In the private sector, the
same five years saw the universal service trans-
fer over $2,200m between carriers through lev-
ies. In addition, there are high administrative
and transaction costs: dozens of legal, regulatory
and accounting personnel minister to the
scheme.
The current policies
This is a very brief summary of the current
policies:
1. The universal service (‘USO’) regime in
the Telecommunications (Consumer
Protection and Service Standards) Act
1999 is administered by the Australian
Communications Authority (ACA).
a) The regime was created to im-
plement the principle that ‘all
people in Australia, wherever
they reside or carry on business,
should have reasonable access,
on a equitable basis’ to tele-
communications, including
digital data services.
b) All carriers must pay a levy,
based on their gross revenue
(and reflecting their market
share) in Australia to subsidise
services to loss-making areas.
c) One carrier, normally Telstra, is
obliged to serve the loss-making
areas. The levy is used to bridge
the gap between the revenue
from those areas and the cost of
serving them.
2. Apart from the USO regime, Common-
wealth funds, which came originally
from the sale of shares in Telstra, are
used to fund targeted schemes for in-
creasing the level of services. The gov-
ernment usually calls this expenditure
the ‘Telstra social bonus’, and it makes
up the $819m mentioned above. Funds
have been used for many programs, in-
cluding: rural transaction centres
($70m), Intelligent Island (Tasmania,
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$40m) and improved Internet access
($36m).
3. It is assumed that at some stage the
market will make the USO regime and
the government spending unnecessary,
although nobody has explained how and
when that will happen. Presumably,
technologies such as terrestrial wireless
and satellite will reduce the cost of pro-
viding rural services to near the cost of
metropolitan services.
4. Parliament and the government have
been willing to intervene actively, and
to spend public money, to improve ser-
vices. Competition does not appear to be
a prime goal. This is a sharp contrast
with most other areas of Commonwealth
government, including the rest of tele-
communications, where the aim for the
last 10 years has been to liberalise, and
to place increasing reliance on the
market.
Regulated price caps set a limit on the services
provided. Another limit is the definition of the
‘standard telephone service’ and the ‘digital data
service’ under the Act. This requires the gov-
ernment to make quite direct decisions about
how much service should be provided to
Australians in rural areas. When suggestions are
made that the level of service should be in-
creased, carriers make the obvious response that
higher service will raise the cost even more. For
example, in the 1998 Digital Data Review, the
ACA concluded that the costs of maintaining an
ISDN service providing a 64 kbps digital data
channel as part of the USO would outweigh the
benefits and that government intervention was
not economically necessary or justifiable. The
government subsequently introduced a special
subsidy to assist customers in the most remote
part of Australia to gain access to an asynchron-
ous satellite-based ISDN service.
Where will the current policies
lead?
The current approach would assume that tele-
communications is maturing enough to respond
to changing consumer needs. In the meantime,
the government is seen as providing the safety
net: the carrier-funded USO scheme, augmented
where necessary by direct government funding
and one-off grants.
It should not be assumed that the status quo is
stable. Some real improvements in service have
been made in the last 10 years, such as providing
local calls at an untimed, capped rate (currently
22c). But telecommunications needs keep chan-
ging as quickly as old problems are solved.
More recent demands are for better mobile, In-
ternet and broadband services.
As services improve, consumer expectations
seem to increase. Specifically, there is always a
new service in the metropolitan areas which
rural consumers believe they should have, under
the ‘equitable access’ policy. It is quite possible
that rural and remote consumers will continue to
be dissatisfied, and that the current need for
government subsidies will continue to increase.
Nor is there much evidence that the rural market
has reached competitive maturity. In the five-
year period starting in 1997/98, little more than
$25m of rural telecommunications subsidies was
allocated to Telstra’s competitors. Yet in the
same period, Telstra received over $1,535m.
This reflects Telstra’s role as the carrier of last
resort, the only one serving most rural markets.
Incentives vs lowest common
denominator
The USO scheme is focused on ensuring that
rural consumers receive a basic level of service,
by bridging financial gaps between the service
which would be commercially viable and the
service the government sees as essential. The
details of the scheme set out in the research pa-
per suggest that this encourages a lowest com-
mon denominator approach. It is not in the inter-
est of the carriers to offer extra levels of service,
as they do in the cities. If they increase the lev-
els of service, they will only increase their costs,
not their profits. It is worth considering whether
the scheme could be changed, to encourage
competition to provide a higher level of service,
and to introduce more carriers.
The parliament has been careful to ensure that
prices for basic telecommunications services are
capped. This is an understandable policy goal, to
ensure that nobody must pay more than a fixed
amount for a basic service, such as 22c for a
local call. However, the price caps collide with
the option of promoting an increase in service
Issues and directions
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levels in rural areas. In a normal market, the
competitors offer a higher level of service for a
higher price. However, the price caps often re-
move this incentive in rural areas.
Would the market deliver better
results?
Many of the experts believe that if there were no
USO scheme and no subsidies, the market would
already be delivering a better service to rural
Australians than they receive now. The most
likely scenarios would be more innovative use
of wireless technologies, including satellites.
There is no doubt that most rural consumers
value telecommunications highly, and would be
prepared to pay for better services.
However, nobody knows exactly what the com-
petitive market would deliver. The current net-
works and services have been moulded by the
current schemes, so that it is not possible to
make an accurate economic projection from the
current market to a free market. Competitors
have little incentive to plan or demonstrate what
they could do, because nobody believes that the
current schemes will end. And it is not possible
to project figures from current services in the
densely populated areas, since they use a differ-
ent mix of technologies and strategies.
Why do the current subsidy
schemes exist?
Surprisingly, there is no simple answer to why
the current schemes exist, as the discussion in
the round table demonstrates. The official reason
is to be found in the Act, quoted above: so that
‘all people in Australia, wherever they reside or
carry on business, should have reasonable ac-
cess, on a equitable basis’ to telecommunica-
tions, including digital data services. But the real
question is why the current package of regula-
tion and subsidies is applied to telecommunica-
tions. The official documents take the need for
special treatment for granted. Other services
such as electricity, banking, broadcasting and
post receive nothing like the same equality of
geographic treatment. Furthermore, telecom-
munications is the only area in which the
Commonwealth intervenes so directly. The an-
swer is not to be found in the constitution, be-
cause the Commonwealth could decide to man-
date equity or equality for just about any area of
service.
It is generally accepted that living and working
in rural areas involves a mix of advantages or
disadvantages. People are free to live in large
centres where electricity, banking, broadcasting
and post will have higher levels of service, or to
pursue the opportunities of a rural location,
where those services will be less. The main
principle which the experts could point to was
the highly networked nature of telecommunica-
tions. It is possible to install an electricity gen-
erator on a remote property to provide power,
but a remote telecommunications service has
little value. Its value for users depends on being
connected to all the other users. But this does
not fully explain the level of special treatment
for telecommunications.
The consensus is that political forces, not ra-
tional principles, are the basis for the telecom-
munications schemes. Since 1901, telephones
and post offices were used to attract votes for
political parties. This has increased since the
government sought to privatise Telstra. The cur-
rent government position is that Telstra will not
be fully privatised until rural telecommunica-
tions services are seen to be satisfactory. All
telecommunications experts agree that there is
no foreseeable possibility of the market being
allowed to decide the quality or extent of rural
telecommunications, not even if Telstra is pri-
vatised. Thus, realistic strategies to improve ser-
vices need assume that there will be schemes of
some kind to reassure rural voters.
Incentives: is there a middle
ground?
Is there a way to increase competition without
entering the political ‘no-go zone’ of a free mar-
ket? Most ideas for encouraging competition run
into the problem that if a rural area is already
unprofitable for one carrier, Telstra, then split-
ting the available revenue between two carriers
would make it even less profitable. However,
the USO scheme might be able to use competi-
tion to actually change the economics of rural
telecommunications service provision. In the
search for reforms along these lines, the research
paper produced these two possibilities:
1. USO subsidies (paid by all carriers) for
a contested area could be increased until
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a carrier determined that it was more
commercially attractive to become a
registered universal service provider
than to pay an increased levy to subsi-
dise Telstra’s operations in that area. In
other words, USO subsidies would be
used actively as behavioural incentives,
rather than just being compensation for
meeting a regulatory obligation. The
subsidy increase would provide finan-
cial motivation for a carrier to enter a
rural telecommunications market when
the net cost of entering the market be-
came less than the increase in its USO
levy.
2. The use of tenders to select an exclusive
universal service provider could be ap-
plied in more areas. For the most remote
areas in Australia (the ‘extended
zones’), in 2001 the government
awarded a contract to Telstra for an ex-
clusive universal service franchise,
based on selection criteria that sought
commitments to more than minimum
USO service levels. The same tendering
process could be applied to rural areas
adjacent to the extended zones. Carriers
would then be motivated to commit to
more than minimum services in order to
win the contract to serve them.
Neither of these options would endanger the
basic USO principles. The competition would be
an extra element, opening the future possibility
of market forces increasing service levels. Dis-
cussion at the round table raised some challen-
ges to the options. There was debate about the
cost of the changes. One view was that increas-
ing USO subsidies in option 1 would flow
through to an increase in the cost of services.
Against that, it was argued that the increases
would all flow back to carriers under the
scheme, so that there would be no net increase in
real costs. There is also an issue about the
amount of active regulation these changes would
involve. On the one hand, the ACA or some
other regulator would need to be pro-active in
assessing markets, and work to encourage com-
petitors to enter. This goes against the current
fashion, in which Commonwealth regulators
(except the ACCC) follow a hands-off approach.
On the other hand, the Commonwealth is al-
ready closely involved in details of rural
telecommunications.
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PART II – Record of the round table
1. Participants
Mark Armstrong Network Insight
Andrew Briggs Telstra Countrywide
Charles Britton Australian Consumers
Association
Phil Chynoweth TransACT Communications
Chris Dalton Dalton Communications
David Havyatt AAPT
Ian McGarrity IMW Media Services
Johanna Plante ACIF
Paul Schoff Minter Ellison
Tony Shaw Australian Communications
Authority
2. Purpose of the round
table
The purpose of this round table, held on 5 March
2002 at Network Insight in Sydney, was to bring
together well-informed people from different
backgrounds to discuss some of the issues sur-
rounding the Universal Service Obligation
(USO) and related rural and remote telecom-
munications issues. It was hoped that by having
this discussion at Network Insight, an inde-
pendent communications policy group, there
would be more scope for fresh and lateral
thinking than the usual official processes allow.
We were fortunate to have around this table a
wider range of viewpoints than usually join such
a dialogue.
The discussion was based on an earlier draft of
the research paper by Chris Dalton. The final
version of his research paper forms Part III of
this publication.
3. About the participants
PROFESSOR MARK ARMSTRONG is the
Director of Network Insight, and is also Info-
coms Adviser at Allens Arthur Robinson.
ANDREW BRIGGS is Group Regulatory
Manager at Telstra Countrywide, the main
player delivering services to rural areas.
CHARLES BRITTON is Senior Policy Offi-
cer, IT and Communications at the Australian
Consumers Association, and has a career back-
ground in the ICT sector.
PHIL CHYNOWETH is Group Manager of
Sales and Marketing at TransACT.
CHRIS DALTON has several years’ experi-
ence as General Manager, Government Affairs,
at Vodafone working on these issues, and before
that at the Department of Communications.
DAVID HAVYATT is Director, Regulatory at
AAPT, and before that was at Hutchison
Communications.
IAN MCGARRITY of IMW Media Services
has planned and built rural broadcasting net-
works in his earlier role as Head of ABC Devel-
opment at the ABC. His company now works on
convergent solutions in rural Australia.
JOHANNA PLANTE is CEO of the peak in-
dustry body ACIF, and has also gained earlier
experience of these issues as a member of
AUSTEL, predecessor of the ACA.
NICO ROEHRICH is Deputy Director of Net-
work Insight and works on telecommunications
policy and regulation.
PAUL SCHOFF is a Senior Associate with
Minter Ellison, a firm which has done work spe-
cifically in this area.
TONY SHAW is Chair of the Australian Com-
munications Authority (ACA). As a senior exec-
utive in the Department of Communications, he
created many of the laws and policies we now
have.
4. Discussion of the
issues
MARK ARMSTRONG, Network Insight:
What are some of the basic issues underlying the
current scheme for remote, regional and rural
communications? What will happen if we con-
tinue with the current scheme in a relatively un-
changed form? Will we reach that ideal point
where rural telecommunications becomes prof-
Rural telecommunications
Network Insight6
itable, so that it no longer needs a USO? Will
consumer expectations tend to run ahead of in-
creases in minimum levels of service offered by
the USO? What motive is there under the current
scheme for carriers to provide higher levels of
service?
DAVID HAVYATT, AAPT: I always find the
rural communications issue to be a slightly dis-
torted one. It is taken as a given that somehow
or other we are meant to deliver the equivalent
of a macadamised road to every location. In
telecommunications this is accepted, but in other
infrastructure decisions this assumption would
have been dismissed out of hand. People would
say: ‘Of course you’re not going to build a
Royal North Shore Hospital in Tamworth’ or:
‘Of course you’re not going to seal every road’.
If we did that, we’d get caught accepting that
equality of service is required. So the conver-
sation always gets off on the wrong foot; we
never discuss what are reasonable expectations.
Historically, the reason for this is that monopo-
list telcos around the world sold that story as
their reason for remaining monopolists. They
relied on the invention of the concept of univer-
sal service back at the start of the last century.
Since then, the whole ethos has never been
challenged. In the 1980s when monopolists be-
gan to be challenged, they reinforced this idea
that competition would mean the end of univer-
sal service.
Global reach adds a final dimension. A whole
range of things that ought, logically, to happen
in regional communications, such as the emer-
gence of suitable technologies, are not happen-
ing. There is no incentive for a person to build
technologies particularly suited to rural areas.
Rather than being determined by any analysis of
the nature of the regional market, it is influenced
by a logic that says: ‘Because America’s got the
same kind of perverted outcome, and Canada’s
got the same kind of perverted outcome, so must
Australia’.
MARK ARMSTRONG: Can you say more
about what kinds of suitable technologies you
had in mind?
DAVID HAVYATT: Well, the ACA’s advice
to the Minister on new USO arrangements in
September 2000 argued that GSM technology
would be a more efficient technology. When you
consider the ability of CDMA base stations to be
daisy-chained, you conclude that there are some
very good wireless technologies that would be
suitable for rural deployment. But no-one’s turn-
ing them out, because there is no vibrant
demand amongst those trying to meet consumer
demands. There are only people trying to meet a
constrained regulatory demand. In other words,
there is no-one really prepared to spend the
money that these things actually cost.
MARK ARMSTRONG: If there was no USO
regime, what kind of services do you think
would be available to rural Australia that are not
available now?
DAVID HAVYATT: If there had been no obli-
gation to provide a USO and no obligation on
Telstra to deliver, in the 1980s there would have
been satellite services to regional and remote
Australia. But you have go back to the very sim-
ple fact that the Digital Radio Converter System
(DRCS) program was only accelerated, and the
Rural and Remote Areas Program (RRAP) only
extended because of the threat of a satellite. One
of the arguments for this, apart from the TV ar-
gument, which took a blessed long time to turn
up, was a rural remote communications argu-
ment. Telecom was desperate to find arguments
to stop the building of a competing tele-
communications infrastructure.
JOHANNA PLANTE, ACIF: But surely the
satellite solution still had to be subsidised to
give the kinds of prices that we were getting?
DAVID HAVYATT: Yes, but I still want
someone to tell me why we think it’s right that
the services are subsidised. No one tells me why
that is right. I might love to run sheep in Pitt
Street in the Sydney CBD, but I can’t.
JOHANNA PLANTE: I have often thought
about this because when my sister, living in
rural Australia, got electricity (a long time be-
fore they got the telephone), they had to pay
over $14,000 to extend the line further down.
Also, at Port Parham where we have just got
water connected, in theory there is a $2,000
infrastructure charge. It’s only 60 km north of
Adelaide, but we nevertheless had to pay for
getting water in the first place.
The difference with telecommunications is that
it has to be connected. For access to other forms
of essential infrastructure, there are other op-
tions. I can buy a generator to get electricity.
Electricity doesn’t have to be connected as I can
Round table
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actually generate it on the spot. I can get water
tanks and get water that way. But with com-
munications, the idea of everyone having a right
to it came from the fact that there wasn’t a ready
alternative that gave you the same functionality.
From that flows the USO. The generator gives
you the same functionality as the grid.
DAVID HAVYATT: Let’s continue the farm-
ing example. If the cost of providing a telephone
to that farm is $X,000, shouldn’t that cost be
included in the economic decision-making of the
farmer as to whether he farms or not?
JOHANNA PLANTE: Well I think it was, be-
cause there wasn’t an alternative. To electricity
there is.
DAVID HAVYATT: I do understand that that
is one of the reasons, but that still doesn’t tell
me why this is a cost to the farmer that we
should be subsidising, as opposed to any other
costs to the farmer we should not be subsidising.
CHARLES BRITTON, Australian Consum-
ers Association: There are a number of parts to
this question. One is why people thought of rural
telecommunications as attracting a USO. That
question can be answered historically, but the
answer may not be amenable in today’s world.
This leads to the second part of the question: Do
we need it now? Of course, history and the pres-
ent are inextricably connected. Nowadays, peo-
ple think that telecommunications is somehow
helping cure the curse of distance, and in turn
limit the ‘tele’ bit in front of ‘communications’.
There is also the national development notion,
and the community development notion: the
principle of people being linked to the total
society.
Looking forward, you can split the question this
way: (1) whether it would become profitable and
economic; and (2) whether there is some sort of
developmental possibility for it to become self-
sustaining. Then there are the questions about
what the impact of technology is on that, and
whether people’s expectations will keep rising
or will be met. This is slightly different to the
subsidy argument.
DAVID HAVYATT: I agree. I come back to
the circularity of the argument. Unless you are
prepared to agree that at some point in time a
person who values their communications has to
express their preference in some way, you’ll
never turn this into a place where you get people
actively developing solutions and services. If all
you are competing for is the size of a subsidy
determined by any methodology whatsoever,
you just don’t get that outcome. I find it really
intriguing when you go to a rural com-
munications workshop and people talk about
how really, really important communications is
in rural areas. They effectively tell you that it is
more important to them than it is to people in the
city, and yet they are not prepared to pay more
for it than someone who doesn’t value it as
highly.
CHRIS DALTON, Dalton Communications: I
question that. Look at the ACA’s USO calcula-
tions. It found that people in rural Australia pay
on average $1,600 per annum for their telecom-
munications. In metropolitan Australia they pay
$500 or $600 per annum. So in practice people
have paid more for telecommunications in rural
Australia than they have in metropolitan
Australia.
The second point I would like to inject into the
debate is the underlying assumption about natu-
ral monopoly. We seem to be saying that there
must be some action, because otherwise people
in rural Australia have to pay more for their
telecommunication services than people in met-
ropolitan Australia. That is something that we
should challenge; because of changes in tech-
nology and increased demand for services.
DAVID HAVYATT: I just don’t know of any
telecommunications technology which is
cheaper to run for a lower population density
than a higher population density.
JOHANNA PLANTE: That is exactly the
point. Population density is the issue.
IAN MCGARRITY, IMW Media Services:
Charles Britton was indicating that a whole host
of cross-subsidisations exist, between the city
and the country, and the country and the city in
reverse. For example, country people subsidise
the city transport system by a very large amount.
The subsidies just exist; they are there, and the
political reality is that they will continue to be
there. Ross Cameron is probably the one in the
Federal Parliament who most often questions
some of these subsidy issues, and who wonders
why the government tends to see a rural vote as
worth more than one for him.
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There is no sign on the political landscape that
the cross-subsidies are going to diminish, so far
as rural communications is concerned. I think
that the political landscape says that the em-
phasis is on it, as it has been on it for the last
five years. As I read the newspapers and the
press releases, the emphasis on cross-subsidies
is probably even greater now than it was in the
early 1980s.
I wonder about the practical value of question-
ing the raison d’etre of this political and social
need, of questioning whether it is good for
Australia, when country people have been en-
couraged in every forum to ask for more than
they already have. They now see the USO sub-
sidy as an inalienable right that the rest of the
country owes them. I am not sure this ques-
tioning gets you very far, because it is there and
it is not going to go away. Perhaps we should
focus instead on the ways to satisfy the political
and social needs.
DAVID HAVYATT: The only reason I always
flag the justification for the subsidy, and like to
flag it first and then move on, is because every
time we say we will improve something, cus-
tomers’ performance expectations rise. So the
first thing to happen is that the customers be-
come less happy. We should continually go back
and re-question the need for government inter-
vention. It’s quality management 101 in which
the government has now caught itself.
IAN MCGARRITY: I am reminded of an
Oscar Wilde quote. One party says to another: ‘I
don’t know why she hates me so. I’ve never
done anything for her’. I suspect when you are
giving subsidies to people you are tied into them
disliking you more than if you have never given
them anything.
DAVID HAVYATT: If we don’t try to find the
circuit breaker we will never improve the
situation.
TONY SHAW, ACA: This issue comes back to
a question of government philosophy with the
current arrangements firmly entrenched in the
system. Prior to 1989 national pricing concepts
were purely voluntary. They were only en-
trenched through government regulation starting
in the early 1990s. Even so, they only apply to a
very limited number of services. There is no rea-
son why service providers cannot compete on
any number of enhanced services and charge
what they like.
CHARLES BRITTON: It is also useful to bear
in mind that telecommunications is one of the
areas where there is some protection of consum-
ers’ ill-gotten, or otherwise, right to services.
Compare this to what has happened to the banks,
government and other services. Consumers have
a case study of protected and subsidised
services, for better or for worse. Look at what
services have disappeared under an unprotected
free market operation.
DAVID HAVYATT: I’ve repeatedly apolo-
gised to every rural consumer I can ever find for
the closure of their banks. The ubiquity of te-
lephony is the prime reason that bank branches
were able to be closed in rural Australia. If the
telephone hadn’t got to everybody, the bank
branches couldn’t have closed. So the USO was
responsible for the closure of bank branches.
MARK ARMSTRONG: This leads us to an-
other basis for having a scheme, even if the cur-
rent scheme has a lot of defects. From an aca-
demic viewpoint you could analyse the system
as a political scientist might, and say that the
way the electoral system and the Senate works,
the way some coincidences, almost, of the par-
liamentary system have worked, has resulted in
a very high emphasis being placed on rural
Australia. A good example is the role of Senator
Harradine in the part privatisation of Telstra. So
the political science view would be one that
said: ‘Forget about whether it’s right or wrong,
it’s just a fact of life’. As Ian McGarrity said,
there have been all kinds of schemes driven by
similar imperatives, going back to soldier settler
schemes, to subsidies for various rural produce.
This doesn’t mean it’s good or bad, it’s simply
something that happens, and that may need to be
taken into account in any reform process.
But there’s another much more modern version,
namely about a vision for the future of telecom-
munications. This is rarely expressed as a vi-
sionary modern concept. Rather, it is expressed
in terms of the objectives that are now in the
Telecommunications Act about Australians,
wherever they live, having access to these ser-
vices. It’s like a very partial version of the
Malaysia 20/20 vision, or the Singapore Intelli-
gent Island vision, or e-Japan, or the Korean
program called Korea Cyber 21, which relate to
the urban populations in many developed count-
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ries. They are visionary programs which try to
embrace a nation’s citizens and bring them into
the electronic world, to boost GDP and to
maximise efficient use of resources.
Some would argue that a scheme that really did
improve rural telecommunications was at least
offering that sort of vision to part of the popu-
lation. I don’t know whether anybody’s done
this, but somebody might try to undertake an
economic analysis of the whole package of rural
services and discuss the efficiencies of, for
example, substituting on-line banking for
banking over the counter, for monitoring stock
prices on the internet, for e-education and
telemedicine.
In a strange way, in an era where vision is politi-
cally incorrect and unfashionable, we actually
do have a vision expressed in stronger terms
about rural Australia. Although this does not
help to decide how to migrate to a better out-
come than the current scheme.
What options are there? A market-based solu-
tion? A competitive allocation system as out-
lined in the research paper? How do you im-
plement any radical change? To put it in other
terms, how would you move to the market sys-
tem which David Havyatt was indicating with
all of its advantages, while still having some
kind of a safety net for people who might other-
wise be left without any service? Is it always
going to be the case that, so long as there is a
safety net, you can’t really have a market-based
scheme? That the safety net will distort the mar-
ket so much as to prevent the market from ever
getting started?
CHRIS DALTON: I’ll just make one input
here, about the issue of whether a natural mo-
nopoly exists or whether we are talking about
the high cost of delivery. We talked earlier about
how it’s more expensive to deliver services in
rural Australia than in metropolitan Australia –
but this doesn’t necessary preclude competition
existing there.
In looking at what options we have for the fu-
ture, it seems to me that we’ve not determined
yet whether a natural monopoly still exists in
rural Australia and, therefore, whether we have
to develop a model based on only one supplier
providing a service. Or whether, given no sub-
sidy at all, a satellite solution would be afford-
able. If so, we may not need a subsidy, as an
affordable service would be available.
So we need to establish whether we should be
modelling systems based on one supplier pro-
viding the services (we could also talk about the
range of services to be provided, which is get-
ting into Ian’s area of convergence) or whether
we consider structures that use competition to
improve the service levels.
MARK ARMSTRONG: How do you model
the competition without actually having a com-
petitive market? Does that mean yet another
large report by an economic consultant?
CHRIS DALTON: No. The first thing to look
at is the Extended Zones tender where a com-
petitive approach was used to deliver an out-
come of just one carrier provision.
TONY SHAW: It’s not one carrier provision,
it’s just that only one carrier is subsidised. Any-
one can provide services in the Extended Zones
if they want to.
ANDREW BRIGGS, Telstra: That is a good
example. Satellite is one solution where it is ef-
ficient to have more than one supplier. The
model that was adopted in Extended Zones, the
reverse auction model, has also been adopted in
other countries. It is an exclusive model where
you just allow one competitor to come in and
tender for the provision of that service for two or
three years. This offers one potential solution.
CHARLES BRITTON: We go back to one of
David’s base level questions. There is a lot of
schizophrenia in the debate about the role of
technology. On the one hand technology is seen
as a breaker of natural monopolies. On the other
hand technology can compound the problem of a
natural monopoly as people expect more and
more, leading to larger and larger subsidies.
JOHANNA PLANTE: Tony, I understand that
nobody has registered to become a competing
USO provider in the two pilot areas. That must
tell us something.
TONY SHAW: Perhaps I can explain that.
There are two principles that drive forward the
sensible debate about universal service
arrangements.
The first is that no government will ever walk
away from the concept of Universal Service.
They are just not going to do it – that is a reality.
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The second is that no government is going to tell
any group in society that they cannot have ac-
cess to competitive supply if they so choose.
These are two fundamental givens that drive
policy in this area.
In relation to competition, the emphasis should
be on provision of service that society believes
is appropriate, for whatever reason. Whether it is
competitive supply or not, really doesn’t matter.
The concept of the contestable areas is to allow
anyone who wants to enter to provide service, to
receive a subsidy based on the number of
customers it serves. It’s not necessarily about
competition because Telstra, if it so chose under
the arrangements, could in fact walk away from
it. Although Telstra is a carrier of last resort, it
need not be in there actively providing service if
USO provision was taken over by some other
supplier.
DAVID HAVYATT: With regard to contesta-
bility pilots, it was particularly unfortunate tim-
ing that when the pilots finally were announced,
most of the established carriers were engaging in
capital reduction programs. It is not now a re-
source priority to enter these markets. If con-
testability pilots had been around from 1997
when people were able to access large sums of
capital, who knows what might have transpired.
TONY SHAW: Well, I’m not sure that that is
actually correct. The calculation of the subsidies
is based on cost recovery, after taking actual
revenues into account. This  suggests that if
anyone enters the USO market on the basis of
those costs, thinking that they can make money,
then the ACA subsidy model is wrong, because
it is based on a break-even answer. The only
reason to enter is because it is on the companies’
broad competitive agenda of having a broader
delivery of services across Australia, gener-
alising brand names and similar benefits.
DAVID HAVYATT: That ignores the import-
ance of common costs. If you used a CDMA
network to supply a subsidy service, there would
be mobile revenue from that service that would
make an additional contribution to the cost of
the investment capital. But because we are not
looking at new ways to invest money, there is
absolutely zero work going on.
ANDREW BRIGGS: In the last couple of years
there have been two contestability models. Port-
able subsidies, which apply in USO contesta-
bility arrangements, and the exclusive subsidy
model in the Extended Zones tender. The Ex-
tended Zones tender attracted four tenders as I
understand it. Another major difference between
it and USO contestability pilots is that the
government provided an additional $150 million
subsidy in the Extended Zones tender.
IAN MCGARRITY: The government could
have done it another way. It could have said: ‘I
want this particular set of services to be deliv-
ered. What are you going to bid to deliver
them?’. What actually happened was an abnor-
mal tender, as the government said: ‘I will give
you $150 million if you win this tender’. Clearly
from the response (at least from Telstra’s per-
spective), $150 million, was over the mark for
producing the base level of service because
Telstra was doing a lot more within that amount.
ANDREW BRIGGS: If the amount had have
been zero dollars would you have really got any
tenderers?
IAN MCGARRITY: No, of course not. But the
normal way to manage a tender is to say: ‘I want
this task done, how much will you need to be
paid in order to do it?’ In this case, the tender
manager said: ‘I’ve got $150 million, how much
can you do for it?’
PAUL SCHOFF, Minter Ellison: The result
may then be a distortion of competitive neu-
trality by allowing some unnecessary ‘fat’.
Maybe that is what led to the subsidisation of
the two-way satellite boxes for Internet access. It
raises questions about what range of services
should be subsidised.
CHRIS DALTON: Does it matter that there
might be some fat if what has happened as a
consequence of the tender is that Telstra is de-
livering more than the minimum service
required?
PAUL SCHOFF: It does matter if the other car-
riers are paying for it.
DAVID HAVYATT: We’re not paying for part
of it, but what you have now is a bizarre out-
come where the most remote people in Australia
get a better USO service than the next tier. This
creates some dynamic tension.
TONY SHAW: I suspect this will continue, in
which case the government will have to respond.
In answer to Johanna’s earlier question, there
have been no new entrants registering in the
Round table
Rural telecommunications policy reform 11
USO contestability pilot areas. We have made
guidelines available, but to date there have been
no registrations. In part it goes to the issues that
David raised about deployment, lack of interest
in investment and the like.
MARK ARMSTRONG: Tell us about com-
petitive entry – the history of it and the policy,
and the simple point that no one has tried doing
that so far.
TONY SHAW: The policy goes back at least to
when our current Minister took over the port-
folio. During a speech in around 1996 he ex-
pressed interest in the concept of competitive
tendering. While it took a few years to devise a
model, we now have a trial system under way.
I guess the government’s policy, which I am not
particularly close to other than administering the
arrangements, is to assess what happens and
then make some decisions about whether such a
law should be applied on a more extensive scale,
or whether other arrangements would be more
appropriate. It is in many ways driven by the
desire of carriers who said that they wanted to
have the opportunity to provide service in loss-
making areas, and were interested in getting
some of the subsidy, at a time when, under ar-
rangements that applied at the time, there was
only one universal service provider prescribed
by the rules.
ANDREW BRIGGS: Contestability was intro-
duced because other carriers said to the gov-
ernment that ‘We can do it cheaper’.
CHARLES BRITTON: It’s interesting too that
in some ways, (and it was always one of our
concerns about the approach), contestability is
hostage to the business cycle. A carrier’s interest
waxes and wanes but the necessity of those areas
being connected is a stable one. The capital
drought impact illustrates this perfectly.
Fortunately, we didn’t have to have burnt toes to
find that out.
TONY SHAW: This is why there is a concept,
even in contestability models, of a provider of
last resort.
JOHANNA PLANTE: What is it that people in
Extended Zones didn’t have, that people in
metro areas had?
TONY SHAW: Untimed local calls and compa-
rable internet access.
JOHANNA PLANTE: What about the pilot
areas? With some exceptions (such as ADSL ac-
cessibility) do those areas have exactly the same
access to telephone services as people in metro
areas?
ANDREW BRIGGS: In terms of standard ser-
vices they do.
JOHANNA PLANTE: So what is it that we’re
trying to solve in those areas?
ANDREW BRIGGS: Presumably, one of the
things they are trying to solve is the reality of
variable data rates.
JOHANNA PLANTE: This is no different in
metro areas. Even people who have got ADSL
talk about how variable their data rates are.
DAVID HAVYATT: The Besley report identi-
fies a few of those issues. The two stand-outs
are: (i) differential mobile coverage (you can’t
get mobile coverage at Barraba, as Tony Win-
dsor quotes on a regular basis); and (ii) quality
of service.
For example, because a reduction in call charges
has increased call volumes and traffic conges-
tion, there are now actual instances in regional
Australia of people not getting dial tone when
they pick up the phone. This is a new phenom-
enon. Quality of service is a difficult issue, as
the Customer Service Guarantee reminds people
in regional Australia that they are worse off. A
two day service guarantee in the bush contrasts
poorly with a two hour service level in metro-
politan areas. Thus de-facto government policy
is to reconfirm to the people in regional Austra-
lia that they are worse off every time that they
talk about it.
The mobile service issue is bizarre. We have
spoken about natural monopolies when there are
still three mobile operators trying to provide
coverage at the fringe of mobile networks. Eco-
nomically it would be of benefit for there to be a
shared network in areas of lower population
density
JOHANNA PLANTE: All three had the re-
quirement to meet certain coverage
commitments.
DAVID HAVYATT: But they kept going.
JOHANNA PLANTE: Not all of them.
DAVID HAVYATT: They all have now.
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ANDREW BRIGGS: The contestability ar-
rangements were designed to allow carriers to
offer mobiles. They created the concept of an
“alternate telephone service” which could very
well be a mobile service.
DAVID HAVYATT: I am stunned that there
are still mobile base stations being built at the
fringes of networks just to grow coverage, par-
ticularly if there are two of them being built in
areas where the volume of traffic would only
ever justify one. It would be economically more
efficient for all concerned if they agreed to share
the base station.
So why are mobiles still as expensive as they
are? The only conclusion that I can reach is that
a large amount of capital is still being spent on
extending the networks into areas where there is
less dense coverage. Otherwise the prices of
mobiles should have been falling a lot faster
than they have been.
I actually don’t know the answer. It’s just some-
thing that continues to intrigue me. Where has
the incentive gone wrong?
TONY SHAW: There is no regulatory con-
straint. It’s purely a commercial incentive.
DAVID HAVYATT: But where is the commer-
cial incentive when competing on coverage is no
longer the game?
CHRIS DALTON: I’d like to return to what
Johanna said about the contestability areas, vis-
à-vis Extended Zones and what you are seeking
to achieve. All we are trying to do is to achieve a
lowest common denominator in terms of guaran-
teeing a minimum level of service for people in
those areas. Under current arrangements, people
in the contestability areas have that same
minimum level of service as people in the met-
ropolitan areas; so no further regulatory inter-
vention is necessary.
The issue is, perhaps, changing consumer ex-
pectations. Is the government just trying to en-
sure a minimum level of service? With a con-
testability approach, customers will have a
choice of service ranges and different tariffs. So
in this instance competition acts as a lever to
increase the level of services the consumers
receive.
So is government policy trying to achieve mini-
mum service levels or something more than
that?
JOHANNA PLANTE: Some contestability out-
comes don’t exist in the metropolitan areas
either, where there is still only one local loop,
except for the six duplicate ones in the capital
cities. I just don’t know what additional com-
petition will occur beyond that. For example, I
don’t expect to get additional competition in,
say, Glebe. I’m not saying that people shouldn’t
have it, I’m just saying you’re unlikely to get it
unless you are in the CBD and/or with a big
company where you can get optic fibre going
past your door.
CHRIS DALTON: Do you think it matters that
there are no carriers registering in the contesta-
bility areas? Or do you think that policy out-
comes will be achieved just by creating con-
testability areas, as it provides greater ability for
a carrier to enter the market? Who is going to
compete against Telstra, when Telstra has exclu-
sive access to the subsidy? You start from be-
hind. But in the event that you can get access to
that subsidy, there is a different dynamic in the
market place that puts a greater competitive
pressure on Telstra. Having created that, does it
matter that nobody’s come in?
JOHANNA PLANTE: It does, because you
don’t know whether the correct model was ad-
opted or whether the model made sense in the
first place.
ANDREW BRIGGS: There are no guarantees,
but it gives you the greatest chance of having
competition in those areas, because it puts Tel-
stra and the other players on equal footing. Tel-
stra currently offers services in those areas and
receives a subsidy. If the other carriers are going
to compete in those areas they should also re-
ceive a subsidy provided they make the same
commitments as Telstra to serve all customers. It
doesn’t mean you’re going to get competition,
but at least it gives you a better chance of getting
competition.
CHARLES BRITTON: Things that facilitate
entry, even in an emotional sense, are politically
useful. It distances politicians from the problem.
If there’s not competition in these areas
politicians can say: ‘Well, don’t blame us, we’ve
done everything we can’.
On the other hand, to agree with Johanna, com-
petition should not be an end in itself, but a
means to an end. The services on the ground
matter, not competition. So the question be-
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comes: ‘How much more do we spend to gener-
ate competition that doesn’t matter?’. Did we
need to spend $150 million to buy competition,
particularly when alternate carriers didn’t actu-
ally win the race? So it goes back to the original
point, that we are here to deliver services on the
ground, and not to deliver a theatre show, or
competition.
DAVID HAVYATT: I must set the record
straight. DCITA and others have added the Ex-
tended Zones tender to the story of contesta-
bility, although this wasn’t how that program
started. Originally, when the Minister identified
a need to get local calls in Extended Zones, Tel-
stra’s response was to say that it would cost
$150 million. Following this, the Minister de-
cided to retain $150 million from the second
Telstra tranche, to be made available to whoever
could fulfil the untimed local call obligation.
So it never was a policy directed at creating an-
other contestability area or being another incen-
tive for competition.
PAUL SCHOFF: One of the reasons for en-
couraging competition is to encourage innova-
tion and better services. Experience shows,
across all industries (such as television in-
dustries, and network industries), that lack of
competition discourages innovation in service
and reduction in cost. Therefore encouraging
competition should also be seen as driving de-
mand for broadband services. This includes all
of those applications that local councils and
governments are trying to fund with varying
degrees of success. There are good reasons why
competition can be seen as a good objective in
the long term. Getting the service on the ground
now is worthwhile, but if it also increases the al-
ready high entry barriers, then that is a bad me-
dium- to long-term outcome for consumers.
CHARLES BRITTON: I agree. But it must be
competition that makes a difference, and not just
an ideological genuflection to competition. Not
all the outcomes of competition are necessarily
positive ones. Competition is a very important
tool, but while it can be a good servant it can
also be a bad master.
IAN MCGARRITY: If you don’t have some
degree of competition then, no matter how good
the process was to establish the initial service,
there tends to be an ossification between the ser-
vice provider and the public about what service
remains acceptable past that initial point of
innovation.
So, if there is no competition, you must put into
that market place something that creates an on-
going assessment of what is a proper level of
service, and what could be done to improve it. I
can accept that the threat of competition can be
the motivator and, in the end, a more positive
social tool than actual competition.
There are two other matters I would like to raise.
I read that facilities competition is difficult to
achieve, particularly in rural markets. Should,
therefore, we concentrate more on getting ser-
vice competition based on shared access to
common facilities?
The other matter is a bit anarchic. For each of
the 40,000 households in the Extended Zones,
Telstra will receive an annual subsidy of ap-
proximately $875, together with a $3,750 ‘flag-
fall’ payment. From this it will deliver what it
considers to be the best service package. The
issue is, how would the outcome differ from a
voucher system, where the householders could
choose what they wanted? Is a ‘top down’ ap-
proach the only practical system?
Would a radical approach of this nature have
some role in USO policy? It works on the prin-
ciple that you give the money to the consumer
and allow the consumer to choose how to spend
that money, having received sales information
from service retailers.
TONY SHAW: Within that modelling, how do
you provide a carrier of the class we’re talking?
ANDREW BRIGGS: It’s a potential model.
ATSIC, for example, has been arguing for some
time that the USO that goes to providing ser-
vices in indigenous communities should be
“cashed out” and ATSIC given the money to
spend however they please on telecommunica-
tion services. However, while it sounds good in
theory, there are no end of problems.
TONY SHAW: But when they can’t get the ser-
vice and they go to the government and say:
‘We’ve got $750 in our pocket but no-one wants
to offer a service’ what should the government
do?
JOHANNA PLANTE: One of the difficulties is
that telecommunications is a network business.
You can’t just go to the shop and buy your ser-
vice for $3,500. The interactive distribution
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infrastructure has to come to you, to allow you
to use it.
The people that live in rural areas know all the
competitive issues. Consequently in the Telstra
privatisation debate they demand mechanisms
for guaranteeing ongoing good service. They
know that in rural areas competition will not be
a driver for these improvements, and so they
know that they must use alternative mecha-
nisms. They actually know from experience
some of the things we are talking about.
IAN MCGARRITY: The network argument
also raises this dichotomy between the facilities
provision, and having a group of people willing
to provide different levels of service over that
network, at whatever connection fee is charged.
I would imagine that the sparser the community,
the greater the likelihood of a natural, absolute
facilities monopoly. But that doesn’t mean the
services couldn’t be dramatically different.
JOHANNA PLANTE: In terms of long dis-
tance competition, rural people do have access
to competition via Optus, AAPT and whoever
else provides pre-selected services. So they do
have access to a choice of long distance services
over the Telstra infrastructure.
TONY SHAW: The underlying obligation to
provide service still remains in a model where
you give people a voucher. In the particular case
of Extended Zones, however, the objective was
to get all people access to untimed calls, which
they had demanded. The fact that the bid in-
cluded an agreed data rate was a consequence of
the competitive tendering process. What hap-
pens if you just give $150 million to individuals
and half the people cannot buy untimed local
calls for the price of their voucher? That’s the
difficulty you face, as you do with any model
that relies on giving consumers money or a
voucher.
MARK ARMSTRONG: Why can’t the people
who receive the money or a voucher buy un-
timed local calls? Because nobody is providing
them?
TONY SHAW: The reality might be that, of the
40,000 customers, 10,000 find that there is no
service provider who is prepared to provide
untimed local calls for the price of their voucher.
And then, where is the Government with its
policy? It must be able to guarantee the practi-
calities of achieving a policy.
MARK ARMSTRONG: Does this mean the
USO levy is not supporting untimed local calls?
TONY SHAW: The arrangement that existed
with the Extended Zones was that there was the
competitive bid for $150 million, plus the on-
going subsidy that is provided under the Uni-
versal Service arrangements, to provide untimed
local calls to those customers who wanted it.
CHARLES BRITTON: The critical word is
‘system’ instead of ‘vouchers’. The voucher idea
doesn’t build a good system. One of the funda-
mental problems of contestability is that it as-
sumes the infrastructure exists. Contestability
‘mines’ the infrastructure for a purpose which is
essentially political. The reason that you don’t
have contestability is that there is not the critical
mass to justify building the facility you want
there.
The problem of the uncontestable or the mar-
ginal customers, is also important. This is also
becoming an issue as we go to contestability in
energy. Commentators have suggested that 50
percent of electricity customers aren’t really
worth having as they generate such small
amounts of revenue, although most rational
large companies will engage in night-time deals
with their customers and will continue to service
them. But the notion of profit and loss is alive
and well, as instanced by some banks saying:
‘It’s wonderful, let’s get rid of the customers
you don’t make money out of’.
ANDREW BRIGGS: A lot of that $150 million
was needed to upgrade the network to provide
untimed local calls. So it is almost impossible to
cash it over on individual bases.
CHRIS DALTON: I wanted to respond to what
Ian said about the vouchers and having a
voucher system. In the contestability areas you
have a virtual voucher system. You don’t actu-
ally give the customer the money, but when the
carrier acquires that customer they get the equi-
valent of the voucher paid to them. That system
also addresses the carrier of last resort issue. If
Telstra is the carrier of last resort and no other
carrier enters the market, then Telstra must pro-
vide that minimum service.
The benefit of this arrangement is that there
must be one carrier of last resort to provide a
minimum service. There is also the flexibility
for other carriers to offer a different range of
services. This means that it is not the gov-
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ernment or the ACA dictating the type of service
to be provided. A customer is not forced to take
the service that the ACA has specified, as a new
carrier can offer a different range of services,
which might more easily fit what the customer
wants.
ANDREW BRIGGS: An important point in the
Extended Zones tender is that Telstra wouldn’t
have been the carrier of last resort if it had not
won the tender. Telstra would have had the op-
tion to withdraw its services completely from
the Extended Zones had it lost the tender. This is
different to the contestability pilot arrangements,
where Telstra has been retained as the carrier of
last resort, even if a competing USO carrier
registers in an area.
DAVID HAVYATT: It is important to recog-
nise that, while Universal Service was only
mandated as a legal obligation in the late 1980s,
the extension of connectivity to a lot of custom-
ers occurred in the early 1980s. This was a result
of the arrival of satellite technology. Com-
petition, or threat of competition, actually has a
history predating today in this area.
An interesting distinction that Charles Britton
has added to the conversation is that between
making infrastructure happen in the first place,
and how you make efficient use of infrastructure
that is there already.
To move the conversation on, when we talk
about users of telecommunications we need to
determine what ‘c’ they are – whether they are
consumers, customers or citizens. Gerry Goggin
identifies the need to include citizens, because
they are at the centre of this telecommunications
debate. The citizens sit in a remote locality and
say: ‘I want more’, but the person they say this
to is situated in Canberra.
Telecommunications is the only service of this
nature that is delivered to citizens in Australia
by the Federal Government. Historically these
kinds of services were better delivered by a local
area, where the citizens have greater control.
The more local the authority, the better the ser-
vice delivery. This opens up the whole question
of whether we’ve got the whole policy position
wrong. The people who own the customer ac-
cess network in regional areas should be the re-
gional citizens, not the Federal Government.
This is a conversation that hasn’t yet started. It is
potentially an interesting one as it provides a dif-
ferent way of engaging the citizens themselves.
Local politics could replace market forces as a
means of meeting rural telecommunications
development needs, although funding may still
need to come from the Federal Government.
MARK ARMSTRONG: How, then, could we
break away from one hundred years of pork-
barrelling, including by the Postmasters General,
who put post offices and the telephones in
electorates that needed cosseting. If we’re going
to adopt a different model that’s not based on
the Commonwealth Government, how would
such a process start? How would a shire council
move on this? How would we, on a nation-wide
basis, see shire councils deciding that they were
moving further into the utility area and gather
resources to provide this?
DAVID HAVYATT: The very first step would
be for the Federal Government to endorse this
approach by passing control of the local network
to local communities because they can run it
better. There is evidence in America of some
remote area telcos managing a local network
better, because they make local decisions about
competing resources. It’s not an impossible
scenario.
MARK ARMSTRONG: What might the op-
tions be? A transfer to local ownership and con-
trol of part of the Telstra network? Funding to
run the network? Or both?
DAVID HAVYATT: I would transfer the net-
work. For a period of time, the same level of
funding would be made available under current
arrangements, on the understanding that no fur-
ther assistance would be provided by the Federal
Government.
PAUL SCHOFF: I’m glad this issue has been
raised. I was thinking about this in the context of
new infrastructure developments funded through
Networking the Nation (NtN) and similar pro-
grams, that might be managed through an infra-
structure trust.
While implementation would be complex, given
our layers of government, it’s easier to deter-
mine responsibilities with a direct funding pro-
gram like NtN. It would require an operator,
perhaps licensed through a nominated carrier
declaration, and an access regime with pricing
that addresses the competitive issues.
Rural telecommunications
Network Insight16
It may be too radical at this stage to hive off a
part of the existing network. An alternative op-
tion may be to use new infrastructure.
MARK ARMSTRONG: How would an infra-
structure trust work? What is it? Who runs it?
What is its origin?
PAUL SCHOFF: This has been discussed, but
as yet there is no set answer. On the NtN side
where there’s direct funding, you could vest
ownership and control of the funded asset in the
relevant authority. With the money given to
telcos with not-for-profit partners, you could
vest control of the asset in the not-for-profit
partner. There would also be an access regime.
JOHANNA PLANTE: This is confusing. Is it
just a series of local monopolies rather than one
big customer access network monopoly? Are
you just talking about country areas, or all of
Australia – so that in Glebe, for example, Leich-
hardt Council would run it?
DAVID HAVYATT: I’m just talking about
country areas. It would be a government mo-
nopoly, but run by the citizens in that geo-
graphic locale, rather than from a central lo-
cation where an averaging approach across the
country would be adopted.
JOHANNA PLANTE: In my experience I find
it difficult to believe that there would be the
requisite kind of expertise and understanding of
operational matters in rural areas – or, for that
matter, in Glebe.
DAVID HAVYATT: This is where the second
part of Paul Schoff’s suggestion comes in. The
owners of the infrastructure would be in the
business of hiring people to run their networks.
So there may be five people across Australia
who compete for the right to manage the council
networks in such a way that they respond to the
community and political requirements of that
area.
JOHANNA PLANTE: Is it a practical solution
at this stage? Where do you draw the line on
which areas to include? Just remote areas? Just
rural areas? Or regional towns, as well, like
Geraldton?
DAVID HAVYATT: All these questions are
wonderfully political!
JOHANNA PLANTE: With T3 to happen
some time in the next couple of years, I can’t see
the government taking this step.
DAVID HAVYATT: It’s an achievable T3
scenario, because the government re-buys the
country network, gives it away, and then priva-
tises the remaining assets comprising Telstra’s
network in the metropolitan areas. It can be done
now.
PAUL SCHOFF: If you add to this nationalised
regional network an access regime that operates
in regional areas, then you would facilitate what
people really want: useful applications and ac-
cessible broadband services.
MARK ARMSTRONG: What would an access
regime administered by, for example the shire
council, look like? Presumably not the current
Trade Practices Act version, but one that in-
volves timely judgements about what will meet
community needs. Would the shire council, for
example, grant access the way they give devel-
opment approval for somebody to build a house
or a shed?
PAUL SCHOFF: It should encourage as much
access as possible in order to facilitate competi-
tive service provision and competitive applica-
tion set-ups. The application side will drive this.
The simplest way to do this would be to set the
access price when the funding is allocated.
MARK ARMSTRONG: So it’s an access re-
gime whereby a shire owns the capacity and
sells carriage to anyone who use the asset.
CHARLES BRITTON: With the mission of
servicing the people, its constituents and its
citizens within the constituency.
PAUL SCHOFF: There would also be a charter
that requires it to deliver services to all, like the
USO, and with significant equity objectives.
DAVID HAVYATT: There are two ways this
could be done. One is that you sell the right to
manage access to the infrastructure as an exclu-
sive franchise; the second is that you sell access
to the infrastructure to many more parties on a
commercial basis.
The person who owns that rural asset doesn’t
have the same economic incentives as Telstra.
When you’re a national telco you have an in-
centive to deny people to access your network,
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as you want to be the only person to exploit its
commercial value.
IAN MCGARRITY: This sounds like putting
the facilities in public hands but managing them
using a professional facilities manager.
The only experience I have of this is with coun-
cils running re-transmission facilities for radio
and television. And they do a terrible job of it.
For example, the Federal Government has the
Television Black Spots Program, which provides
initial capital, but no recurrent expenditure. I
suspect that in 10 to 15 years time these
facilities will start to fall over through the lack
of maintenance and ongoing work by the coun-
cils. At that stage, the councils will quite cyni-
cally say: ‘We’re not in this business; the gov-
ernment needs to give us some money to replace
the facilities’ and at the same time let the com-
munity have no television or radio until the
Government is forced to provide funding. That’s
what is happening in many places around
Australia now, under the self-help program. But
this probably arises where there is a relatively
small facility, managed by a relatively unso-
phisticated council that doesn’t understand the
ongoing recurrent needs of facilities
management
I assume that David Havyatt and Paul Schoff are
proposing there be professional facilities man-
agers engaged to run assets that are of a sub-
stantial size. In my experience you need to make
absolutely sure that the local council clearly
understands the complexity of the task, and that
there is a clear allocation of responsibility for
managing those facilities.
PHIL CHYNOWETH, TransACT: My com-
pany, TransACT, provides an interesting case
study. During the 1990s when the broadband
networks were rolled out in Sydney and Mel-
bourne, but not Canberra, the ACT utility com-
panies got together and decided to invest and set
up a telecommunication company to provide
broadband access to Canberra citizens. It made a
lot of sense as Canberra has the highest pen-
etration of PCs and internet users in Australia.
This provides a model for local council involve-
ment elsewhere in Australia. Basically the ACT
Government said ACTEW and AGL should do
it. This struck a chord with AGL because they
were looking at multi-utility models for delivery
of water, gas, electricity and telecommunica-
tions. So they provided a means of funding the
initiative that may not be available to a local
council that relies solely on rates as income.
We’re also examining similar initiatives else-
where in Australia. Powertel in Newcastle is
now setting up a telecommunications network
infrastructure. which the major players had de-
cided just wasn’t worth it, or economic for them
to provide. So this is something happening now
in Australia. It’s quite innovative and not a theo-
retical exercise. We’ll see how it goes.
I’m struck by the viewpoint here that presumes
that we know best for the citizen and the com-
munity. What we’ve noticed is that communities
are deciding what services and applications they
want. It’s not necessarily base voice services,
but the applications and a whole range of
services and industries that are built on those
services that people want. Often people in Can-
berra, or this group here, have no idea, but
nevertheless make some big assumptions about
what rural communities really want.
MARK ARMSTRONG: Phil, tell us something
about the role of local government in Canberra
in relation to what ACTEW does and, if you
know any more about what is happening in other
areas such as Newcastle.
PHIL CHYNOWETH: I can’t speak for New-
castle, but the ACT government is a major in-
vestor in ACTEW, and TransACT is a joint
venture between ACTEW and AGL. The ACT
government was a catalyst in getting TransACT
started, using ACTEW as a funding arm.
The important things are right of carriage and
right of way. We are able to use and lay cable
along the electricity passage, or under the con-
duits where AGL are putting their gas lines. This
is probably the key issue for a small telecom-
munications player.
Competition has been there, if at all, only in
name. Competition in telecommunications is not
the same as competition in other markets. Most
government policy assumes Telstra is there. This
may not be the right policy but that is the reality.
In Canberra we’ve noticed that with many of the
businesses and government contracts, there isn’t
competition at all because Telstra has the local
loop. It is very difficult for anybody else to
compete with Telstra in such circumstances.
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MARK ARMSTRONG: Does the ACT gov-
ernment have a governance supervision role in
relation to ACTEW?
PHIL CHYNOWETH: Only through its direc-
tors. It is a privately owned company so the
other investors such as AGL, TBG in Hong
Kong, and ACTEW also have directors on the
Board. There is a local chairman.
MARK ARMSTRONG: Is there a Code of
Practice or a set of rules?
PHIL CHYNOWETH: Yes, of course, it has
articles of association like any company.
MARK ARMSTRONG: That’s the internal
structure, but in terms of the external relation-
ship with the ACT government, is that a con-
tract, or is it anything more than having directors
on the board?
PHIL CHYNOWETH: The ACT government
is not yet a user of services. We don’t have a
contract with them at all.
DAVID HAVYATT: Lots of electricity auth-
orities, many of which are still owned by gov-
ernments, have engaged in similar activities
under the guise of being a commercial initiative.
Logically, if there are two pieces of infrastruc-
ture being deployed down streets and requiring
many of the same skills to run them, then there
would appear to be scope for economies of scale
to be achieved. Yet this does not happen.
Similarly in regional and remote Australia, if
there is one technician who fixes wire A and
another who fixes wire B, there is scope for ec-
onomies of scale, which could then lead to hav-
ing more people closer to the customer, rather
than engaged in running separate infrastructures.
MARK ARMSTRONG: It’s economical from
the service provider’s viewpoint to have maxi-
mum sharing of facilities. This also ties in with
user expectations in remote areas. In practical
terms, telecommunications, broadcasting, post,
Flying Doctor and emergency services all have a
common life-line function, but they are all per-
ceived in policy terms as separate niches which
attach themselves to different planning, entre-
preneurs, and systems.
DAVID HAVYATT: A further negative is that
there are people in regional Australia who have
got this all compartmentalised with a ‘cargo
cult’ mentality: ‘These things get sent to us from
Canberra, or whatever my state capital is’. This
is further compounded by the dysfunctional way
local government has been run historically,
especially in regional areas.
But government should not give up on this. If
there is a future for regional and remote Austra-
lia, it’s going to be created by regional and re-
mote Australia, not by any number of people
gathered together in Canberra, trying to create it.
MARK ARMSTRONG: If each local gov-
ernment were provided with the basic telecom-
munications infrastructure, what else is needed?
Obviously funding, presumably financed out of
the proceeds of the T3 sale for hand-over and
start-up costs. What if a local government says
‘We don’t want it, as we’d rather have an exist-
ing carrier or a national body like Telstra, con-
tinue to provide the service’? Is there a way to
oblige them?
JOHANNA PLANTE: There would be many
different views. In the NtN program some in-
itiatives have come from local governments and
some are a joint venture with a carrier, but many
come from other parts of the community that are
more pro-active in communications matters.
I also see that we are creating wonderful busi-
ness opportunities for these facilities managers,
but you need to do a lot more than just give local
government money. You’d have to draw up
contracts that the local governments could use to
employ facilities managers and provide lots of
assistance and guidance along the way. The ‘Ma
and Pa’ telephone companies in the States have
not been successes in the long term.
PHIL CHYNOWETH: I agree.
JOHANNA PLANTE: TransACT is a lot dif-
ferent. ACTEW is an electricity company.
PHIL CHYNOWETH: People are in telecom-
munications not for the base services but for all
the applications that sit on top of them. Now the
challenge is: who is in the best position to
understand, exploit and capitalise on that? It’s
the people who are closer to the community who
understand these things. I’ve spoken to farmers
and they want quite different applications. They
rely on long-term weather forecasts and
improved productivity. Our farming community
is so efficient because of the absolute boom that
it had through the Internet. Internet is not a ‘like
to have’, it’s a ‘must have’ for efficient
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agriculture. For example, one farmer has
telemetry points and cameras on all of his bores
around his very extensive property as an alter-
native to wearing out three or four vehicles
every year. So what we provide through univer-
sal service arrangements to these people in rural
areas may not necessarily satisfy what they
need.
JOHANNA PLANTE: A few years ago, I made
a presentation that defended not expanding the
USO, saying that when it was voice, it was a
homogenous product and everyone wanted the
voice.
Now the USO is no longer homogenous. Some
people want data, some people want video, some
people want telemetry. Now we see all these
other applications that people are using the tech-
nology for, but they are not coming through the
local council. They are coming through many
different groups such as the National Farmer’s
Federation or the local community library group.
They don’t come from the local government.
PHIL CHYNOWETH: Whether it comes from
the local government or the local utility, there
should be a focus on the applications or services
of telecommunications infrastructure, rather than
the means for providing them. This is a different
perspective, but the approach is not going to
deliver anything of use. It delivers mediocrity,
as opposed to the innovation that that the coun-
try needs.
ANDREW BRIGGS: Are you saying that you
don’t necessarily need to divide up the current
network assets to get those outcomes?
PHIL CHYNOWETH: No.
ANDREW BRIGGS: One of the reasons we
started up Telstra Countrywide 12 months ago
was to get local management closer to the peo-
ple in the regional areas. Approximately five to
ten years ago Telstra centralised many of its
senior management roles. It is now moving them
back into regional areas – this is one of the
major reasons for establishing the business unit
of Telstra Countrywide. This was a commercial,
not political, initiative, as many commentators
believe. Country customers are profitable in the
main, just as they are in urban areas.
MARK ARMSTRONG: What areas are we
talking about? Centres of the size of Dubbo,
Wagga, Bathurst and Albury?
ANDREW BRIGGS: Yes, that type of area.
The economics of serving a customer in an
urban area is not greatly different whether it is in
a metropolitan or regional area.
DAVID HAVYATT: The other day I was dis-
cussing with a Telstra employee how he had
been sitting in a park in Goulburn two years ago
talking to someone about finding accommoda-
tion for the Goulburn District Office. Twenty-
two years previously he had sat in the same park
with a Telecom manager, looking for an office
for the then operations department to start up in
Goulburn.
MARK ARMSTRONG: So Telstra Country-
wide is about spreading managers across rural
areas?
ANDREW BRIGGS: It is about a range of
things - improving service, growing revenues,
increasing the range of products and services,
getting management closer to the customer, and
better understanding the needs of country cus-
tomers. Basically doing some of the things that
you talked about before. You don’t necessarily
have to control all the network assets to do that.
It’s in the applications that sit on top of the
network.
I have a number of concerns with this notion of
somehow dividing up the network. I suppose my
concerns parallel the points that Ian made. In
theory it sounds okay; in practice there are many
problems. The closest we have to this sort of
arrangement are the community telcos, which
don’t necessarily own their network assets.
Many of them are struggling at the moment for
reasons such as lack of practical expertise in
running a telco.
There are big questions about to what extent do
local groups have the expertise to offer those
services?
MARK ARMSTRONG: We might resolve
those practical day-to-day management issues a
little. In the hypothetical example of our shire
telecommunications access network (a legacy
from Telstra) is it likely to be offering a retail
telecommunication service, or will it always
have a player that’s in a lot of markets retailing
facilities to the customer? Can anybody help us
paint the hypothetical picture of the typical shire
telecommunications access network?
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DAVID HAVYATT: This could operate as a
version of contestable areas. The current alter-
native to contestable entry is contestable areas,
where you divide up the world and offer the
rights to manage. The first thing the council
would do would be to invite in that person
whose real job was going to be to manage the
network.
There would also be an incentive to make as
many opportunities available as possible for
people to utilise this asset. There’s a greater in-
centive for those network operators to volunteer
access than there would be for multiple provid-
ers in an area. In addition, whilst each individual
area is a monopoly, there is still some com-
petition between the areas, and there’s compe-
tition between who’s going to provide.
To ensure a competitive dynamic remains in the
infrastructure management industry it may be
necessary to impose market share limits as has
been the case with spectrum auctions.
CHARLES BRITTON: A number of points
come up here. The innovation and diversity ar-
guments that were made before are certainly im-
portant. For example, people tend to take for
granted the base level of voice connectivity. In
the pursuit of the innovation and diversity, you
must not get some people dropping out of the
voice networks as a consequence.
As in banking, if you too enthusiastically and
naively seek diversity and innovation, and neg-
lect to maintain base service levels (because
you’ve taken them for granted), there may be
unintended consequences of some people losing
those services.
What we said during the previous election was
that one size doesn’t fit all of Australia. A big
problem the government has in leading up to
trying to privatise Telstra is that it is treating the
whole of Australia as one big telecommuni-
cations puddle, which it is not. We suggested a
geographic focus that recognises rural and re-
gional issues as a separate problem.
While I know there is a lot of debate about this,
and the economics are problematic, we should
quarantine rural issues from wider telecom-
munications debate. It’s an area with its own
problems and issues and should be treated sepa-
rately. Then we would be able to comment on
structural separation of the rest of Telstra whole-
sale and retail. There should be both structural
and regional separation. Once there is regional
separation then issues relating to structural
separation can be addressed.
There could also be a transitional phase, man-
aged on an experimental basis. Some areas
might adopt the regional access model, and oth-
ers for the regional monopoly model. The ACA
could supervise the pilots, as there is no doubt a
need to have ongoing Federal oversight. It
would be very difficult not to have Federal Par-
liament involvement. They should have a posi-
tive role or they will just meddle.
MARK ARMSTRONG: A possible example
might be remote area television and community
television in rural areas. Although the process
was a difficult one, it was possible to find a
range of services including a number of services
run by indigenous communities, to provide
television to a great diversity of areas within
Australia.
It’s difficult because, for example religious, cul-
tural and educational opportunities attract a wide
range of groups to provide television and radio
services. These services, however, aren’t pro-
vided by local government authorities but by
different regional, educational, church and local
affiliated communities. Some are commercial
and some non-commercial.
Another model, which might have the problem
of engaging the Federal Government too much
as a regulator or a monitor (and thus defeat the
whole purpose of a fresh approach) involves let-
ting the tender for the local telecommunications
assets. It may offer the local government body
some priority (if that body wants to take over the
service), but also allows involvement by a local
progress association or some other body with
business skills, such as an agricultural co-opera-
tive, or a body that is already involved in pro-
viding other local utilities with some standard
obligations.
Having put forward these models, I note that,
unlike Germany or many western European
countries where the local body and its burgers
have perhaps 500 years of experience in running
banks and a wide range of services, in many
areas in Australia our local government entities
were somewhat artificially created.
DAVID HAVYATT: This is a very important
issue that needs to be recognised. Rural and
remote Australia was built very rapidly based on
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a capital cities’ model; we never actually estab-
lished rural and remote Australia. This hasn’t
been helped by the fact that over the last few
years every government, not just Telstra, has
taken the approach of recentralising decision
making. The State government has been pulling
administrative units out of regional and remote
Australia. This is a far wider issue about how
regional and remote Australia takes charge of
running itself and becomes responsible for its
own future. The whole telecommunications
policy debate is distorted by that failing.
TONY SHAW: The only reason that there
could be any support for such a model would be
a judgement that the locals are better able to ar-
ticulate, identify and supply the local demands,
than a commercial operator.
There’s at least one commercial operator in re-
gional Australia now, so there must be some
perception that another operator can provide a
quality and diversity of service that meet these
particular people’s needs in a better way than the
market currently supplies, despite the fact that
the market already has an unbundled local loop,
access regimes and all the other things that allow
suppliers to get in and provide service and, in-
deed, to build infrastructure if they think there’s
a dollar to be made there.
Nor is there any guarantee that a local council
wouldn’t take any profits (if the network was
profitable to start with) and churn them into
something else, such as local libraries, rather
than supply telecommunications services.
If a service is loss-making to start with, then
why would a company take on that service and
the risk of not having any money to supply it?
The practicalities, let alone the objective you
start with, suggest that a different model is
needed.
MARK ARMSTRONG: Wouldn’t the local
government, equipped possibly with the current
USO funding or something similar, have a far
stronger motive to provide an access network
than anybody else? Wouldn’t they have other
quasi-commercial reasons for wanting to ensure
a good telecommunications infrastructure?
TONY SHAW: They might, but who’s going to
pay? Everyone would love to have a perfect sys-
tem and not pay for it. I would like to be able to
connect to TransACT without having to pay.
The reality is that you’ve got to pay, and in in-
herently loss-making areas, how are you actually
going to generate the revenue that will cover the
provision of these services?
DAVID HAVYATT: If it’s good policy to sub-
sidise, then one could continue to subsidise the
service, but the subsidy should be via a far more
transparent process. For example, a subsidy
worth three per cent of revenue could be levied
and distributed, rather than there being some
kind of torturous game of trying to estimate a
genuine loss and pass it back to the largest
player on the market. That is an absurdity. I’d
prefer a transparent process of raising a tax and
handing it out.
TONY SHAW: Why shouldn’t these regional
companies form part of the tax base?
DAVID HAVYATT: Let’s have that conversa-
tion when we work out how we structure it.
TONY SHAW: There has been a long debate
about USO subsidy levels, and there has also
been a lot of confusion about how the subsidy
levels underwrite what services rural customers
really need. The sole basis of the last formal
subsidy estimate that the ACA did is the provi-
sion of the standard service. It doesn’t include
the extra revenue that a supplier might receive
from supplying other services in conjunction
with the standard service. The methodology was
built around a hypothetical network that is
probably no longer relevant.
The way in which the value of the capital base is
calculated is to use measures of the cost of alter-
nate technologies. People confuse that with the
concept that GSM, for example, might be the
more profitable way of providing service in
these areas. That isn’t true. The best and cheap-
est way of providing services is probably the
system that’s there. It’s just that the underlying
capital base is only worth what the cheapest
technology would be if you are going to replace
it. So the GSM capital costs are just used as a
substitute for the value of the network. It’s not
that you actually build a new network; rather
you value what’s there by estimating the cost of
the cheapest alternative technology. Thus there
is a misperception that you can provide univer-
sal service in a cheaper way than what you are
actually doing now, in real resource cost terms.
Having said all that, the model probably has
reached its use-by-date and is no longer a robust
means of calculating subsidy levels. It’s fair to
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say that it doesn’t allow for economies of scale
when you’re determining what the costs of the
capital might be, say, with GSM networks as a
surrogate for the current system.
So against that background, if there were to be
any subsidy calculations in the future, there
would need to be either a substantial addition to
the model or some other method.
DAVID HAVYATT: Because it is so fallible, it
would be just as good to choose any number we
like as the amount we are going to subsidise
these people, because of where they live. It’s a
political decision in the final analysis. Anyone
who wants to use a well-reasoned economic
model is mad. If you could successfully model
what happens in competitive markets or efficient
investment decisions, we’d live in a planned
economy.
MARK ARMSTRONG: Why is some kind of
hypothecation acceptable in this area when in so
many other areas, it’s said to be impossible or a
really bad way to apply funds?
For example, there’s been debate for a few de-
cades about whether television licence fees
should be applied to funding drama production,
children’s programmes or anything else. For a
brief period there was, although the usual argu-
ment is that this money should not, under any
circumstances, be ear-marked for the area from
which it came but instead go into consolidated
revenue.
This strengthens the point that, if different forms
of taxes are extracted from telcos then they
should go into consolidated revenue, and some-
body should decide what was the social or eco-
nomic need for areas to be subsidised. I’m not
taking a position; rather I’m trying to put that
argument.
Before we address the various costing issues
Tony Shaw has raised, we should finish discus-
sion on the local government model. Perhaps
somebody can think of a better name for that,
such as the Local Trust?
DAVID HAVYATT: The Active Citizen
Model.
ANDREW BRIGGS: One of the few areas
where regional service provision has gotten
going is the concept that Bendigo Bank intro-
duced, where the local community went into
partnership with the bank, provided the capital
and provided a service that met a need that pre-
viously wasn’t being met.
Now unfortunately telecommunications is a lot
more complex than setting up a shop front and
providing banking services. But the Bendigo
Bank concept is one of the few that appears like
it will work. Keep in mind that the local groups
had to put up the money to make it happen.
CHRIS DALTON: How big is the problem?
Have we talked enough about what it is we are
trying to fix that demands the sort of solutions
that we’re considering?
It comes back to what role we want government
to play: Is it to ensure the provision of a lowest
common denominator level of service? To fix
the barriers to entry? To be innovative in en-
couraging economic development? What in the
current arrangements are so seriously deficient
that the government has to intervene further?
It is premature to start looking at solutions be-
fore we really properly understood what it is
we’re trying to fix. Is the problem sufficiently
big that it demands some radical action or major
change by us? If we’re saying that government –
be it local, state or federal – must be involved,
how then should we respond to a converging
environment that might require continual
adjustment?
Everyone in Australia now has access to un-
timed local calls. This would have been an ac-
ceptable policy outcome 10 years ago. But now
we could suggest new targets that might require
a continuing role for government. Is that really
what we want?
DAVID HAVYATT: I agree. The current pro-
cess completely disconnects the person’s prob-
lem we’re trying to solve, from the person who
solving the problem. It means that we are going
to continually see the need for intervention, be-
cause there’s something being created. What I’m
suggesting is that we need the people with the
problem to become more directly involved in
working for the solution.
The bigger political issue is about how to ad-
dress rural and remote problems in an ongoing
way, rather than just trying to deal with the
telecommunications problem. Otherwise we are
just going to wind up in an endless process of
forever thinking we’ve got to try to provide
more and more and more, for a smaller and
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smaller group of people who have no commit-
ment to the outcome.
Rural and remote Australia is not homogenous.
In many of these communities the people who
have caused the communities their problems in
the first place have been their own leading citi-
zens. For example, it was the farmers who took
their banking to the city, leading to a closure of
regional banks.
MARK ARMSTRONG: Many of these com-
munities are mining communities; they are in
very remote places which look inaccessible, but
in fact they are increasingly online to, say, Mel-
bourne, Sydney or Perth. They also probably
have a higher level of communications capacity
than many people in metropolitan areas, because
the mining companies compensate their
employees for living in a difficult location by
giving them everything they can electronically.
In that environment, a town that is essentially a
one-company mining town is going to want a
very different approach from the typical strug-
gling bush town, which has just lost its bank and
is in danger of losing its Base Hospital.
JOHANNA PLANTE: Chris Dalton and Tony
Shaw are basically saying the same thing. What
are the big issues we are trying to solve? What
are the rural and remote communications ser-
vices, apart from mobile coverage, that people
out there want?
David Havyatt is addressing the issue of ways of
not calculating the USO subsidy. This is his so-
lution – it’s not about getting better services to
the rural and remote people. There’s nothing
wrong with that either. It’s a solution to getting
the government out of doing these USO subsidy
assessments every year. But is it going to ad-
dress the actual rural and remote communication
problems that the individuals out there have, any
better than the current situation?
Nor are we talking about mining towns; there
are not that many and they are well looked after.
With regard to the models where companies get
together with local governments or other groups
to set up a commercial operation, at the last NtN
funding round we knocked back almost all
Building Additional Regional Networks
(BARN) applications on the basis that the mod-
els were unlikely to be sustainable without on-
going subsidies.
DAVID HAVYATT: I fully support all those
comments. I find the idea weird that you spend
government money to fund people to build com-
peting networks in these areas. It’s the wrong
way to get the citizens active.
JOHANNA PLANTE: Half the time it’s those
companies, not the citizens, that are the drivers.
It may not be like the Bendigo Bank at all.
CHRIS DALTON: To rephrase what I said
earlier, are we getting the best value out of
around $500 million in telecommunications sub-
sidies that are being paid through the USO, NtN
and other mechanisms? Are there better ways of
getting results?
MARK ARMSTRONG: One option is whether
the level of government that looks after rural
telecommunications now should keep looking
after it. A second is whether there should be a
guarantee that everybody gets a certain level of
service. How can we best address this, at least
for the immediate future?
PHIL CHYNOWETH: We spoke earlier about
Singapore. What they were after was not a stan-
dard telecommunications offering to the people,
but an economic competitive advantage within
the region and also the world.
So also, when we look at our markets and the
people we serve, that’s what the people are
asking for. The businesses and people are look-
ing for something different to make things bet-
ter, as opposed to providing a common set of
services.
Obviously you must have both, but within gov-
ernment policy we don’t have anything about
economic competitiveness and yet telecom-
munications infrastructure is central to this,
whether you’re out on the farm trying to be
competitive or in a regional centres. That's what
is lacking.
We did an interesting study. In Canberra we
asked: ‘Does anybody know what broadband
means?’ Seventy percent of businesses and resi-
dents didn’t understand clearly what broadband
was. While the greater majority of people are
certain about what outcomes they want, they
aren’t really talking technology.
IAN MCGARRITY: The most useful defini-
tion that the Sydney conference on Broadband
came up with was ‘always on’ and ‘faster
speed’. So if you asked: ‘Would you like your
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internet to be always on and at a fast speed?’, I
think you’d get a very significantly more in-
formed response than if you asked: ‘Do you
want broadband?’.
CHARLES BRITTON: For me, broadband is a
meaningless term. What I consider to be fast
today may not be considered fast tomorrow.
MARK ARMSTRONG: Chris, as most of you
know, is the person running SPAN’s Broadband
Xchange project, so this is all grist for his mill.
From the supply side, broadband is a very sen-
sible thing to talk about. You’re building net-
works with radically different capacity, and
using different technologies to deliver them.
Unconsciously, providers have slipped into
transferring what they do into what they offer to
the customer. For example, Telstra has trans-
ferred its internal arrangements and different
business modules to how it faces the customer.
Others do the same. They don’t understand that
there is another language for customers, where
you talk about what you can do for them. Instead
they use the language they’re used to using
when planning and building networks.
PHIL CHYNOWETH: As a result the major
benefits are all assumed. With convergence and
the emergence of related IT and network-based
applications, it is very difficult to generalise
about what those benefits are, because they’re
very specific to an industry or to a group or an
application. This is the key issue.
We’ve got the capability of providing broad-
band, but availability is not the problem any-
more. Instead we need to talk about the benefits
that somebody will get out of it.
CHARLES BRITTON: Simplification is useful
because ‘better’ and ‘faster’ are really good
terms. But then it comes down to what you are
being charged for, what you want to pay for it,
and what your expectations were of what you
were sold.
In this regard, ‘unlimited’ is not a good word to
be used in a telecommunications marketing
context, particularly in the context of faster
speeds. Telstra has now, quite cleverly, seg-
mented broadband speed and capacity. A po-
tential trap for customers is that the faster the
service, the more the customer can download
data really quickly; but if a capacity limit is
passed, then higher costs are incurred.
DAVID HAVYATT: This is about real costs. It
is one of the errors of broadband to suggest that
somehow, just because the pipe’s fatter, you can
get more data, without there being more costs
elsewhere in the structure.
CHARLES BRITTON: I’m not saying it
should be free, but people must have an abso-
lutely clear understanding of what it is they’re
buying. The marketing messages need to be
clearer. One of the big problems of broadband is
that it does have this notion of a big pipe and
free contents, while in fact not even the bit car-
riage is free.
PHIL CHYNOWETH: One of the big issues
for broadband carriers is bad debt. This might be
addressed in part by having a warning that
shows you’re getting close to your monthly
limit.
DAVID HAVYATT: I’m told that that’s one of
the key features of Optus broadband.
MARK ARMSTRONG: Telstra has a sophisti-
cated meter that can send you an email that says:
‘10 days into the month and you’ve used 80 per-
cent of your download’.
IAN MCGARRITY: Are there peak, off-peak
and shoulder rates?
MARK ARMSTRONG: No.
IAN MCGARRITY: So there’s no efficient use
of the network?
ANDREW BRIGGS: ADSL is a new product,
so you can’t expect the whole market to be in
some sort of magical equilibrium from day one.
There are still a lot of issues to be worked
through. These sort of teasing problems are part
and parcel of introducing a new product with
different pricing paradigms.
JOHANNA PLANTE: Rural and remote areas
can’t get access to it anyway outside the towns.
DAVID HAVYATT: A problem in tendering
for the Extended Zones project was that the ex-
isting network asset was not transferred. So, the
model that we were considering included a
transfer of the asset, and then a tender for the
running of the asset. Perhaps we could also dis-
cuss some of the other options in the research
paper, such as whether increasing subsidies to
encourage competitive carriers would make a
difference?
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MARK ARMSTRONG: More tendering and
increasing the subsidy are just two options in the
research paper, which proposes a number of
variations to the current system. What others are
there?
CHRIS DALTON: The paper is centred on the
question of what can be done to motivate carri-
ers to do more in rural Australia, assuming there
is a need to do more.
The first option focuses on contestability areas.
If nobody has registered as a contestable carrier,
and we think that is a deficiency, and we want
to get somebody else registering as a contestable
carrier, then consideration could be given to in-
creasing the size of the subsidy. At some point
Optus, or another carrier, might decide that it is
better to register as a universal carrier in that
area at a lower cost than subsidising Telstra’s
operation in that area. A variation within this, as
outlined in the example in Appendix 5, depends
on the relative contribution levels of a carrier
like Optus, and a regional carrier. The subsidy
would not need to be increased, once a commer-
cial agreement was reached between those car-
riers about which one of them was registering as
a USO operator.
The underlying premise is that the subsidy
scheme can be used to stimulate behavioural
responses by carriers. As it is an industry-funded
scheme, the net cost to a carrier of an increase in
the subsidy is measured in terms of the net
change in the cost of subsidy payments and loss
making activities.
MARK ARMSTRONG: What offer would
you, as the ACA, make to carriers to get them
interested?
CHRIS DALTON: If no carrier has registered
to be a competing universal service carrier, then
the ACA can announce that it will increase the
subsidy level from, say, $500 to $600. After six
months the ACA could increase the level by an-
other $100 if no carrier registers. This could
continue until a carrier registers.
This puts information into the market about the
cost of the USO scheme as a means of attracting
a second carrier in the market. If the signal is put
into the market place, that this subsidy is just
going to increase until another carrier enters the
market, then an objective market-based value of
the universal service obligation in that area will
be set.
MARK ARMSTRONG: How does this work
for a potential competing carrier?
CHRIS DALTON: Suppose I am Optus, and in
a contestable area I am effectively paying Tel-
stra, through the USO levy fund, a $200,000
USO subsidy. By entering that market as a
competing carrier I still pay $200,000 into the
USO levy fund, I also incur a cost by entering
the market, but I generate new revenue for my-
self, from my new USO customers and from
reimbursement of some of my contribution to
the USO levy fund.
So I do a calculation along the lines that my net
cost in entering the market place is $50,000, but
the increase in my contribution to the USO levy
fund is only $25,000. At what point will the in-
crease in USO levy fund contributions exceed
the net cost of entering the market, thereby
making it more attractive for me to enter the
market?’
JOHANNA PLANTE: Would Telstra still be
getting the subsidy?
ANDREW BRIGGS: Yes, and we’d get the
increase.
JOHANNA PLANTE: So Telstra gets an in-
creased amount for a customer, as does the new
carrier. Basically, it is increasing the cost of ser-
vice provision, with the benefit that there is a
competitor in the area.
CHRIS DALTON: There’s not an increase in
the cost of service provision, as it is increasing
the subsidy with the benefit that you have two
players rather than one.
ANDREW BRIGGS: It would increase the cost
of service provision to other customers, as the
tax on them increases.
CHRIS DALTON: Look at the levy side. Tel-
stra meets 80 percent of that levy. So when you
increase the subsidy amount, Telstra incurs most
of that cost. Telstra pays it to itself, so the actual
real cost within the industry changes very
marginally.
JOHANNA PLANTE: It’s impossible.
TONY SHAW: It’s totally wrong. If you in-
crease the subsidy, then you’re going to add this
increment of subsidy on to the top of the USO
levy. It doesn’t matter who changes it, it’s a real
cost to the industry, and it gets passed on to
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customers by shareholders. It is a real cost to the
industry, whichever way you want to look at it.
CHARLES BRITTON: This raises issues
about whether we are prepared to spend in order
to buy the appearance of competition, and
whether we are providing basic services, or ad-
ditional services.
From a general consumer perspective it’s im-
portant that rural and regional Australia are
included. It’s also expected that over time, a
basic service would migrate up the chain. But
whatever is at the very top of the service chain
should not necessarily be provided.
So it depends whether you want to pay for the
appearance of competition, when the basic ser-
vice is being provided at a lower cost. It doesn’t
make sense from either a consumer or general
common-sense perspective.
ANDREW BRIGGS: The model moves away
from having to determine the cost through some
type of administrative arrangement, to having
the market determine it through bids for subsi-
dies. The price or subsidy is arrived at by carri-
ers bidding for subsidies based on providing
particular services in particular areas. This is
like an auction, and similar to what they did in
the Extended Zones.
CHRIS DALTON: This is an important distinc-
tion. The subsidy becomes an incentive rather
than a reimbursement for cost, where there’s
also an issue about whether the cost has been
correctly estimated, or not.
It’s also important to question why other carriers
are not in the market place. One of the reasons
may be because the subsidy isn’t high enough to
make it worthwhile for that second carrier to be
in the market offering that universal service. If it
is not high enough, there is nothing wrong in
any respect with increasing that subsidy so that
it more closely resembles what the cost is.
Otherwise Telstra is subsidising the delivery of
that service at a higher level than the other carri-
ers. So this approach provides a market dynamic
to test out whether the subsidy is at the right
level or not.
On the issue of whether it raises overall costs
within the industry, suppose the USO amount is
one million dollars. Telstra contributes $800,000
to this amount and the other carriers contribute
$200,000. If you raise the subsidy by 10 percent,
the overall increase is $100,000; Telstra contri-
butes $80,000, and the other carriers will contri-
bute $20,000 of the increase. In this circum-
stance, the net increase in cost to the industry is
$20,000, not $100,000.
TONY SHAW: It is a fact however that the net
amount of the subsidy that needs to be shared
amongst players goes up. It doesn’t matter who
pays it, it’s still a cost on industry that will be
borne by either users of networks or the owners
of networks and services, one or the other.
Someone’s got to bear it.
The fundamental questions are: (i) do you want
to pay to achieve competition? and (ii) will that
competition provide a better quality and range of
services at a reduced price? Then, if you’re
prepared to do it for contestable areas, the adja-
cent zone will want you to pay for competition
there, too. In which case the whole of the sub-
sidy level will rise, and you must ask yourself:
‘What are the net benefits?’ If they’re not there,
then don’t do it.
DAVID HAVYATT: If the cost increases by 10
percent, then the subsidy payments by everyone
increase by 10 percent. The fact that 80 percent
of the subsidy is being paid by Telstra doesn’t
change that.
Of all the possible outcomes from the contesta-
bility pilots, the worst outcome would have been
for too many people registering, as this would
have indicated that the subsidy was set too high.
Equally, if no one registered then this wouldn’t
mean that it is too low, for the range of reasons
we’ve already mentioned. In other words, the
contestability pilots are doing exactly what one
would have hoped. The fact that no one has reg-
istered is not necessarily a matter for concern. If
no one registers in another three years, then
maybe you would question the process. Capital
investment decisions are moderately long run
and capital is needed to compete in this market.
So we should not move rapidly to increase the
subsidy.
CHARLES BRITTON: In part it is an eco-
nomic theory issue – that the market will find
the right price. But this assumes there are at least
two Telstras out there. So what you’re doing is
finding the price needed to encourage new en-
trants, in other words, paying for the competi-
tion. If there were already new entrants out
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there, or established players, it would be a dif-
ferent matter.
The market is not going to determine the cost of
the USO; it’s going to determine the cost of at-
tracting new entrants. It is an investment issue.
Rather than expecting the new entrant to make
an investment and then recoup it, this model
says: ‘Let us make it for you’.
IAN MCGARRITY: I don’t agree that the cost
would rise for all the industry. If the subsidy is
set too low and Telstra loses ‘x’ million dollars
every year in meeting its universal service obli-
gations, then that loss flows through Telstra’s
prices to other customers, and to its competitive
position in the market place.
So by raising the subsidy you might be spread-
ing Telstra’s loss more fairly across the whole
industry, in proportion to the revenue that they
now earn. If, however, you are a big organisa-
tion like Telstra, then the cost to you of entering
a marginal market place that the contestability
areas are presumed to be, should be significantly
lower than that for a new entrant. So raising the
subsidy level to the point where others might
enter the market may well go past recouping any
losses that Telstra might be make. While the
suggested model is intellectually interesting, it
puts a further layer of sophistication on
something that’s already not all that perfect and
probably takes it just that little bit further away
from reality.
PHIL CHYNOWETH: It could be a pretty
blunt instrument. A subsidy approach is a lazy
way that won’t necessarily create a sustainable
business model in the long term.
CHRIS DALTON: The basic question still re-
mains: ‘Do you want to attract another carrier
into the contestable areas?’ It is by no means
certain that the answer is: ‘Yes’. It might be suf-
ficient just to have that scheme there. What the
paper proposes is based on the premise that you
have already reached the conclusion that it is
desirable to attract competition.
A second point is that the approach is much
more economically justifiably if the subsidy is
set at a level that is below cost. Once the subsidy
exceeds the cost, then undesirable market
distortions may occur.
A key question is: ‘What is the actual gain?’ Is
the extra cost of implementing a sophisticated,
elaborate approach merited on the basis of the
benefit it will achieve in the long term by intro-
ducing competition?
MARK ARMSTRONG: What about the sec-
ond option you raised?
CHRIS DALTON: The second option relates to
the Extended Zones approach. As discussed
earlier, just as a neighbouring area to a contesta-
bility pilot area might seek a contestability solu-
tion, so also a neighbouring area to the Extended
Zones might seek an Extended Zones solution.
The Extended Zones initiative is clever policy.
Telstra is now committed to provide untimed
local calls in those areas on a commercial basis,
although there is no guarantee that Telstra will
retain 100 percent of USO subsidies in those
areas after the first three years. It has also set a
benchmark on subsidy levels in those areas, as
Telstra has made a commercial judgement that it
is in its shareholders’ interests for it to commit
to provide these services at the nominated sub-
sidy levels. Further, it is offering a higher level
of service than it would have provided under the
former compliance regime.
In other words, Telstra can no longer argue that
the subsidy levels are too low, since it has de-
termined, on commercial grounds, that they are
sufficiently high to justify Telstra entering into a
contractual commitment to be the unique univer-
sal service provider in those areas.
The Extended Zones approach is a first step in a
transition to an incentives approach away from a
compliance approach. Can it now be applied to
the next ring around the Extended Zones?
In passing, it is also interesting to note that the
outcome provides a useful benchmark for the
size of the USO subsidy in other areas, which
must be lower than the level that has been ac-
cepted by the market for the Extended Zones,
which are the most remote, lowest population
density areas in Australia.
MARK ARMSTRONG: What would you ten-
der for?
CHRIS DALTON: You could tender to be the
exclusive USO provider.
DAVID HAVYATT: What is the dynamic in
the tender process? It’s an artificial auction be-
cause no one can compete with Telstra in such
an auction, given the extent of Telstra’s current
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employed asset. This was a stumbling block in
the Extended Zones tender. So the problem to be
addressed is how to construct a viable tender
process where only one carrier has an existing
network.
IAN MCGARRITY: It is essentially a political
process to determine what services a particular
segment of the population should have. A gov-
ernment can decide that, for legitimate reasons,
particular communities are systematically ex-
periencing a communications disadvantage and
that action should be taken politically to redress
this.
Once this judgement has been made, then the
use of tenders is a sensible marketplace mecha-
nism to use. One of the greatest difficulties,
however, would be how much effort Telstra’s
competitors will put in, given Telstra’s success
in the Extended Zones.
CHRIS DALTON: I don’t disagree with what
either David Havyatt or Ian McGarrity has said.
But if no new schemes are introduced, are we
going to engage in another debate in three years
time about the level of the USO in these other
zones? I suspect few people would want to enter
into another two to three year debate on es-
timating USO subsidy levels. Conversely, if
there is not going to be further debate about the
level of USO subsidy, then maybe we don’t
have to do anything.
Further to this, if the government wants to in-
crease the scope of the standard telephone ser-
vice, then tendering is a way to proceed. This
raises the question of the extent to which the
government should be pro-active about ubiqui-
tous access to higher service levels, and how
much it should let the marketplace decided what
those new levels of minimum service should be.
So if you’re happy with the status quo, there’s
going to be no further debate amongst carriers
about subsidy levels, and there’s going to be no
further debate about increasing the access rights
of citizens to telecommunication services, and
no further change is needed. But if this is not the
case, what should the response be?
MARK ARMSTRONG: To put it another way,
if you don’t take up those options, what do you
do about the USO scheme? Does it continue on
in its current form forever?
CHRIS DALTON: Another issue raised by the
research paper is that of maximising the use of
the USO subsidies, the NtN grants and other
communications-related grants, such as for
broadcasting services. For instance, how does
the Government secure the most effective use of
over $500 million per annum in rural communi-
cations subsidies?
If there is only going to be one carrier in an area,
then what are the funding solutions that will de-
liver maximum effectiveness and use of that
money across a converging communications in-
dustry? Do you confine the reforms to telecom-
munications and USO matters alone, or do you
broaden them in some way and, say, allow only
USO carriers to have the right of access to other
communications-sector grants?
CHARLES BRITTON: To return for a mo-
ment to the question of whether the USO will
persist, in my opinion it will. There is nothing in
the discussion today to suggest that there has
been any real systematic diminution in the dis-
advantages that regional Australia experiences.
There's a real struggle even to get competition,
let alone for competition to have a significant
effect. Nor is technology the solution. Technol-
ogy changes both more quickly and more slowly
than you expect.
So it’s not possible to predict that the USO will
be unnecessary in a couple of years as a result of
the advent of ‘x’ technology. Rather, the USO is
with us, at least for the medium term, for a dec-
ade or more.
JOHANNA PLANTE: I agree. There is noth-
ing in the cost structures of any of the new tech-
nologies or in competition that will change the
need for subsidies. The only thing that could
change is if the Government were to commit to a
policy of broadband for everybody.
MARK ARMSTRONG: How do you secure
long term growth through investment of this
$500 million? An economically correct argu-
ment might conclude that none of these short-
term initiatives should be undertaken. From a
political perspective, however, should the reve-
nue from the next tranche of Telstra go towards
improving uneconomic rural roads and other
politically attractive initiatives, but which don’t
increase Australia’s competitiveness; or towards
investment in rural telecommunications that will
promote growth in the longer term?
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DAVID HAVYATT: I doubt that any spending
on rural telecommunications improves Austra-
lia’s competitiveness. I suspect that it improves
our competitiveness in the services industry, not
the agricultural industries.
IAN MCGARRITY: The bulk of the rural
economy is not in agriculture, but in provincial
towns.
DAVID HAVYATT: No one in the provincial
towns is being paid the USO subsidy. So this
telecommunications spending is not going to
grow the economy.
PHIL CHYNOWETH: Most properties do use
the internet for access to weather forecasts and
for tools to assist crop plantation, for example.
This is part of the reason why they’ve been so
efficient. The use of data and information is a
very key for achieving efficiency in the rural
industry. Good communications is also just as
important for exports and our resources industry.
MARK ARMSTRONG: An alternative way to
spend this $500 million is based on a town plan-
ning argument – that it’s a lot better to use rural
infrastructure to deliver services from a wide
range of locations rather than from Melbourne
or Sydney. This could deliver savings on
education by offering higher level, higher qual-
ity education to people who are in remote areas.
TONY SHAW: This is a very important point.
In this regard we need to remember that there is
already provision that everyone in Australia can
get access, at a price, to a 64 kbps data service.
So if any farmer wants access, it’s already there
if they want to pay for it. The difficulty is that
people usually don’t want to pay the price. They
want an improved service, but at the same price
they have now.
CHARLES BRITTON: Sustainability is very
important for rural telecommunications. I would
hope that the initiatives covered by ‘listing
costs’ include investments that address
sustainability issues.
Another key macro-economic notion concerns
the concentration of skills in metropolitan re-
gions. People migrate to denser markets to ex-
ercise their specialisations. That’s why top range
businesses go to New York and why a general
practitioner in Orange comes to Sydney to be a
specialist. This is a fundamental dynamic in a
market economy.
So regional Australia’s problem is not just a
technological one relating to distance and
population density. It also arises as a conse-
quence of economic and geographic factors that
are independent of telecommunications services.
Any rural telecommunications solutions must
also take into account these factors.
DAVID HAVYATT: I agree. This is why we
need to have a conversation about regional and
remote Australia in general, rather than regional
and remote Australian telecommunications in
particular. Maybe the Whitlam Government had
certain aspects of rural and remote Australian
policy right, in terms of regional development
centres.
We also need intervention strategies that focus
on demand-side factors. We should work with
an industry that has a well-defined need and then
seek solutions from the supply side. We have a
tendency, however, to work on the supply-side
of this problem, with the approach ‘build it and
they will come’. What happens is that we built it
and they don’t come. Any money spent should
be spent on the demand side, not the supply side.
MARK ARMSTRONG: Demand aggregation
schemes are excellent in theory, but extremely
difficult in practice.
DAVID HAVYATT: I’m not only suggesting
demand aggregation. We must also work with
the people who will benefit from our services, so
that they see the benefit and are prepared to
make the expenditure.
JOHANNA PLANTE: I support that, as I
would be the first to encourage an open, bal-
anced assessment of the effectiveness of the
$250 million NtN fund. But having said that,
given that $250 million doesn’t buy much tele-
communications infrastructure, and that the
allocation of funds was in response to commu-
nity requests, most projects were initiated from
the demand side. The exception was mobile
phone coverage, which has been a success in its
own right.
So NtN has been primarily driven by the de-
mand side, in funding telecentres, training pro-
grams and portals for the tourist industry. It has
not had a purely technical infrastructure focus.
MARK ARMSTRONG: Moving on from this,
how would an access regime address some of
these rural issues? Are they different, or more
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difficult to implement in rural areas than in the
CBDs or residential areas with the local loop? Is
it the same issue or are there some differences?
DAVID HAVYATT: There is a failure of the
access regime because that regime is geared
towards facilities-based competition, and we’re
examining markets where the teledensity is by
definition much lower and the economic viabil-
ity of having duplicate infrastructure is lower.
The same access regime applied to both markets
doesn’t deliver the right kind of consequences.
For example, there is no way an access regime
applied to mobile networks will ever mandate
domestic roaming, as ATUG continues to de-
mand. It is not logical for metropolitan areas.
This is not the case, however, once you get past
a certain boundary line in rural and remote
Australia.
While it might be possible to use the competitive
dynamic created by people who own infrastruc-
ture in the cities to agree to use a common infra-
structure in the regions, the access regime pre-
vents this happening. This is due to a national
markets focus and the need for the access regime
to be triggered by an access seeker.
The answer to it is not necessarily in the access
regime but in other processes, such as conces-
sional tax arrangements or incentives for shared
infrastructure investments. Nothing in the cur-
rent access regime will allow the needs of a
regional market to bubble to the surface, as all
access decisions are made on the basis of what is
happening in the metropolitan markets.
MARK ARMSTRONG: What is stopping
more rational sharing of the facilities in regional
areas?
CHRIS DALTON: There should be a policy
that if public funds were used to build infra-
structure, then the recipient should provide ac-
cess to allow the other carriers to share that in-
frastructure.
DAVID HAVYATT: The problem is two-fold.
First, the access process didn’t work well until
recently. But the real failure was a lack of com-
mon, shared base stations, particularly those at
the networks’ extremities, where one base sta-
tion could easily handle the traffic volumes of
all three operators, not just one.
JOHANNA PLANTE: These grants were allo-
cated on a tender basis, and where at most only
50 percent of the capital cost was provided. So
the carriers that lodged tenders had to assess
their traffic loads, their operating costs and their
capital costs and then decide whether to proceed.
If after that you change the rules and require a
traffic sharing arrangement with two other op-
erators, it may no longer be a viable business
proposition.
DAVID HAVYATT: Open access only in-
creases the traffic, it never takes away the traf-
fic, so I don’t know why sharing does not hap-
pen. It may principally be because it is not in the
minds of the decision makers, and there is no-
one forcing them to address the issue in a logical
way. For example, the facilities access regime
was only unblocked when Senator Campbell
forced the issue with the carriers.
MARK ARMSTRONG: Is there any difference
between this and access under Part XIC of the
Trade Practices Act?
DAVID HAVYATT: A classic example is the
debate between declaring the unbundled local
loop and declaring a wholesale DSL service.
In regional Australia, where it makes no sense to
duplicate infrastructure, declaring the wholesale
DSL service may be the solution. In metropoli-
tan Australia, where facilities-based competition
right to the local exchange is more viable, de-
claring the unbundled local loop may be prefer-
able. But we end up having to declare a whole-
sale ADSL service everywhere, or to declare the
unbundled local loop everywhere. Whereas the
solution required in each market is different. The
access regime is a blunt instrument.
IAN MCGARRITY: I’m concerned to hear that
the access regime for sites and towers is flawed.
In looking at the same issue with broadcasting
sites and towers, I was referred to the telecom-
munications access regime. I understood, how-
ever, that Crown Castle has now bought both
Optus and Vodafone towers and so would be
wanting to promote a shared facilities strategy,
for good commercial reasons.
With regard to broadcasters’ site sharing experi-
ences, the Broadcasting Services Act describes
broadcasting sites and towers as a network but
they are not a network at all. Each one of them is
a separate entity unto itself.
There has not been any worthwhile effort in that
marketplace to introduce good quality access
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decisions. For instance, you could get access for
a tower at Mount Sugarloaf near Newcastle, but
that won’t necessarily assist you to get access to
a tower in Rockhampton.
The experience in the telecommunications ac-
cess regime was also used as the reason why
certain aspects of telecommunications access
regimes in respect to digital television were re-
moved from the National Transmission Network
Act.
I am very concerned about the cost of infrastruc-
ture roll out, whether for 3G, for digital televi-
sion or for digital radio, when it comes. I won-
der whether there might be some policy innova-
tion that might bring together the infrastructure
that is being built for these wireless and fixed
line services?
In addition to the $500 million in rural telecom-
munications subsidies mentioned in the research
paper, the Government is allocating about $60
million for the Television Black Spots Program,
and regional television operators will also get
$250 million to assist them to roll out digital
services. There have also been sales tax conces-
sions and licence fee rebates. Could the funds
allocated for rolling out digital television in rural
Australia be used in a consolidated way with
USO and other telecommunications subsidies to
facilitate broadband internet access?
Network Insight32
Rural telecommunications policy reform 33
PART III – Research paper
by Chris Dalton
1. Introduction
Regional, rural and remote telecommunications
services have attracted growing consumer,
commercial and political attention since the an-
nouncement in 1988 of a program of micro-
economic reform in telecommunications.1 This
paper provides an overview of related regulatory
and political events during this fifteen-year
period, and proposes a conceptual framework
against which they can be analysed and new
rural telecommunications initiatives can be
developed.
Box 1: Telecommunications in
Australia
Australia-wide2
7.5 million residential lines in 2000
$9,000 million infrastructure investment in 2000/01
$19,000 million total telecommunications services
revenue in 2000
13 per cent annual revenue growth 1997 – 2000
Rural Australia3
0.4 million loss-making residential lines in 1998/99
$545 million in revenue received by Telstra in
1998/99 from those services
$280 million in net losses incurred by Telstra in
1998/99 on those services
                                                      
1 Senator Evans, ‘Australian Telecommunications Services:
A New Framework’, Statement by the Minister for
Transport and Communications, Australian Government
Publishing Service (AGPS), Canberra, 1988
2 Productivity Commission, ‘Telecommunications
Competition Regulation, Report No 16’, AusInfo,
http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiry/telecommunications/finalrep
ort/index.html Canberra, 2001, Ch 3
3 Australian Communications Authority (ACA), Estimate
of the Net Universal Service Costs for 1998/99 and
1999/2000’, AGPS
http://www.aca.gov.au/consumer/uso/NUSC_Est1998-
2000.pdf, January 2000
Throughout this paper, the term ‘rural’ is used in
a generic way to encompass all those parts of
Australia where a telecommunications carrier
could provide basic telecommunications services
only at a loss.
Rural telecommunications services grew in im-
portance during the term of the second Howard
Ministry (1998 – 2001), attracting a high level
of political attention, although only constituting
less than 5 per cent of the Australian telecom-
munications market (see Box 1).
This activity matched the electoral significance
of the rural sector. First, the Coalition gov-
ernment’s majority in the House of Representa-
tives depended on the outcome of elections in a
number of marginal rural electorates. Second,
the rural sector had the electoral capacity to re-
duce the Coalition’s representation in the Sen-
ate, thereby further constraining the exercise of
power by a Coalition government. It was also
stimulated by factors specific to the rural sector:
•  an economic decline in the rural sector in
the 1990s;
•  strong linkages between the National Party
and rural Australia;
• the electoral threat posed by One Nation to
the National Party;
•  the Coalition’s agenda for privatising Tel-
stra; and
•  increased demand for access to better tele-
communications services.
What has not received attention is the extent to
which this increase in government activity con-
tributed to a widening gap between the tele-
communications services that rural consumers
wanted and the services that were supplied to
them.
There is very little academic analysis of rural
telecommunications issues in Australia. Debate
has rarely gone beyond commentary on poor
carrier performance, Telstra privatisation issues
and predictable calls for government interven-
tion in the form of more funding initiatives and
enhanced compliance measures.
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This paper first reviews the achievements of the
micro-economic reform program. It then sug-
gests options for a new approach that is more
responsive to an industry where both the de-
mand and the supply sides are changing very
rapidly. It finishes with some proposals that set
new targets for telecommunications, reduce un-
necessary service duplication, improve cost-
efficiencies and capitalise on market forces.
These proposals exploit carrier funding of Uni-
versal Service Obligation4 (USO) losses, com-
mercial leverage derived from the high level of
rural telecommunications subsidies, and the
converging nature of telecommunications. The
overall point is that continued use of a strategy
that is ‘more of the same’ will lead to a widen-
ing of the digital divide that exists between
metropolitan and rural Australia. Greater ex-
ploitation of the factors influencing carrier be-
haviour is suggested, given the growing com-
mercial attractiveness to carriers of the rural
telecommunications market.
2. Background
Under the Constitution of Australia, the provi-
sion of telecommunications services is primarily
a federal responsibility.5 Originally the
Commonwealth exercised this responsibility
through the Postmaster-General, a government
minister, and the Postmaster-General’s Depart-
ment. For brevity, the minister and department
are referred to as ‘the PMG’ below. Since 1901,
as indicated in Box 2, many players have been
influential in shaping the development of rural
telecommunications policy.
With the commencement of the Telecommuni-
cations Act 1975, responsibility for the delivery
of domestic telecommunications services was
transferred from the PMG to the Australian
Telecommunications Commission (Telecom
Australia), a new statutory authority operating at
arm’s length from government. Telecom
Australia inherited the management, personnel,
work practices, business systems, customers and
infrastructure from the PMG. Australia’s inter-
                                                      
4 The term Community Service Obligation is also used.
More recently Universal Service Obligation has become the
more commonly accepted term in Australia and so for
consistency is used throughout this paper.
5 Section 51(v) of the Constitution gives the federal
government power to pass laws for ‘postal, telegraphic,
telephonic and other like services’.
national telecommunications services, however,
remained the responsibility of the publicly
owned Overseas Telecommunications Commis-
sion (OTC).6
In 1988 the Minister for Transport and Com-
munications announced a program of micro-
economic reform to put the delivery of tele-
communications services in Australia on a more
commercial footing. Telecom Australia was re-
structured to become a business corporation and
in 1991 it was merged with OTC to form a verti-
cally integrated provider to Australian consum-
ers of domestic and international telecommuni-
cations services. It was subsequently renamed
Telstra, competing with Optus and Vodafone,
two new privately-owned carriers. Later, the
Telecommunications Act 1997 became the pri-
mary statute governing the delivery of telecom-
munications services. The universal service re-
gime in that Act then became the subject of the
Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and
Services Standards) Act 1999. The main object
of the regime, stated in the 1999 Act, is:
to ensure that all people in Austra-
lia, wherever they reside or carry on
business, should have reasonable
access, on an equitable basis, to:
(a) standard telephone services;
and
(b) payphones; and
(c) prescribed carriage services;
and
(d) digital data services.7
Inherent in this statement of consumer rights are
the concepts of equity, reasonable access and
minimum service. Equity is a word frequently
used in the USO context, where its meaning is
limited to covering equitable access rights. The
core USO principle is that wherever someone is
in Australia, they have equal right of access to a
defined basic suite of services, at or above a
minimum quality standard; and at or below a
defined price. There is little disagreement about
this principle that a consumer’s telecommunica-
tions rights should be independent of location.
                                                      
6 OTC was established as the body responsible for
Australia’s overseas telecommunications in 1946 under the
Overseas Telecommunications Act 1946.
7 Section 4, Part 1, Telecommunications (Consumer
Protection and Service Standards) Act 1999.
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There is much debate, however, about the defi-
nitions of reasonable access and minimum ser-
vice, which in turn raise issues such as afford-
ability, service range, service quality, pricing
and customer choice. The suitability of the
measures implemented to ensure that these
minimum standards are achieved, although im-
portant, has attracted less attention.
Box 2: The Players
The Minister Federal Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts.1
The Department Federal Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts
(DCITA) advising the Minister on portfolio matters
The ACA The Australian Communications Authority, the telecommunications industry
regulator responsible for managing universal service arrangements and
associated inter-carrier payment arrangements
NtN Board The Networking the Nation Board, responsible for managing the $250 million
program established by the Government to assist the economic and social
development of regional, rural and remote Australia by funding specific
telecommunications projects
Besley Inquiry Established by the Howard Government in March 2000 to assess and certify the
adequacy of telecommunications services in Australia (a pre-requisite to any
further sale of Telstra shares)
Telstra As Australia’s primary universal service provider, Telstra has the statutory
obligation to supply the standard telephone service to anyone in Australia,
wherever they reside or carry on their business, on an equitable and affordable
basis
Competing carriers AAPT, Hutchison, Optus, Vodafone, etc, which, with Telstra, fund the losses
incurred by Telstra in meeting its universal service obligations, and can register
as competing universal service providers in USO contestability areas
Bellcore International Company engaged by the ACA, Telstra, Optus and Vodafone to build a cost-
proxy model to estimate the size of the losses incurred by Telstra in meeting its
universal service obligations
STSRG The Standard Telephone Service Review Group, a working party appointed by
the Minister to determine whether a change in the level of service mandated
under USO legislation was required
BTCE The federal Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics, an economic
research group that produced the original estimate of the losses incurred by
Telstra in meeting its universal service obligations
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The focus here is on which regulatory measures
are necessary to ensure that minimum consumer
rights are met. This also requires some consider-
ation of minimum service matters, as there is a
dynamic relationship between the two. A more
cost-effective service delivery methodology
should lead to improved consumer benefits, and
hence to less reliance on a prescriptive regula-
tory solution. It is not the aim of this paper,
however, to examine whether consumers’ tele-
communications rights are adequately defined in
legislation, beyond commenting on how al-
ternative strategies might deliver more than
statutory minimum service levels.
3. Origins (1901 – 1991)
Before 1991, the delivery of rural telecommuni-
cations services was based on the principles of
monopoly, prescription, compliance and cost
subsidisation:
•  an assumption of natural monopoly condi-
tions surrounding the provision of rural
telecommunications services;
•  prescription of the minimum level of tele-
communications services that should be ac-
cessible to all Australians on an equitable
basis;
•  compliance with regulated prices to ensure
that these prescribed services would be de-
livered on an affordable basis; and
•  existence of subsidies (carrier-, rather than
budget-,8 funded) to cover losses incurred
in delivering prescribed services at regu-
lated prices.
The term ‘natural monopoly’ is used in a generic
way, to cover a market where it is uneconomic
for there to be more than one service provider.
In this instance it is applied to the supply of
services in the rural telecommunications market,
where it is assumed that costs would be too high,
and revenue too low, to support competing
telecommunications carriers.
There was no competition in the provision of
telecommunications services in Australia from
Federation to 1991. Even as late as 1982, no ac-
tion was taken to implement the findings of the
Davidson Inquiry that there should be competi-
tion in the resale of telecommunications capacity
                                                      
8 References to the budget are references to the Federal
Budget.
and installation of private networks.9 Without
the benefit of competition to motivate the PMG
to achieve service improvements and cost-
efficiencies, the government used two principal
tools to secure improvements in rural telecom-
munications services: service prescription en-
forced by statute; and direct control over the
PMG as a federal department of state. This dual
approach stimulated the roll-out of telecom-
munications infrastructure and services across
Australia, but not necessarily in an optimal way.
The PMG had few external incentives to im-
prove cost-effectiveness and the government
required management decisions to meet politi-
cal, rather than operational and efficiency, goals.
The PMG provided a convenient channel
through which political objectives – such as job
creation and improved services – could be
achieved in rural electorates. As Ann Moyal said
in her book Clear Across Australia:
There were clearly rural votes in communications and
in the spreading telephone and television lines, a
point recognised in the appointment from the late
1920s of Postmasters-General drawn from the Coun-
try Party and often from the Upper House.10
The restructuring of the PMG from a federal
department into a federal commission (Telecom
Australia) did little to change this. There were
still no competitive forces to pressure Telecom
Australia to deliver services to rural Australia in
a more cost-effective manner, to reduce tariffs,
or to introduce new services; while the potential
for political intervention remained. Rural tele-
communications was not a contentious policy
area for government to manage. Provided it
could satisfactorily balance minimum service
levels (including prices, as regulated through
price controls) against the size of the annual di-
vidend Telecom Australia paid to the Common-
wealth, there was little political incentive for
change. This started to change with the an-
nouncement in 1988 of a program of micro-eco-
nomic reform in telecommunications.
Box 3 provides an overview of initiatives that
have occurred since then. Box 4 provides a
                                                      
9 Communications Law Centre, ‘Australian
Telecommunications Regulation – The CLC Guide’,
Communications Law Centre, Sydney, November 1997, Ch
1
http://www.comslaw.org.au/research/Telecommunications/
19971120_clcguide.html
10 A. Moyal, Clear Across Australia: A History of
Telecommunications, Nelson, Melbourne, 1984, p. 205
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summary of the key components of the USO
arrangements introduced in 1991.
4. The reform agenda
With the introduction of competition in 1991,
changes were made to ensure that Telecom
Australia experienced no commercial disadvan-
tage as a result of retaining statutory universal
service obligations. This proved to be a complex
matter.
Box 3: Chronology
1988 Statement by the Minister for
Transport and Communications on
a framework for reform in the tele-
communications industry
1989 BTCE Report on USO costs
Telecommunications Act 1991
1992 Optus commenced service provi-
sion
Vodafone commenced service
provision
Dispute about the size of Telstra’s
USO claim
1996 Bellcore International engaged to
build USO cost proxy model
Review of Standard Telephone
Service
Regional Telecommunications
Infrastructure Fund, later renamed
Networking the Nation, established
($250 million)
Telecommunications Act 1997
1998 Customer Service Guarantee intro-
duced ACA Digital Data Review
Telstra required to make an ISDN-
equivalent service available to 96
per cent of the population
Additional funding allocated to
Networking the Nation ($60
million)
Telstra lodges $1.8 billion USO
claim
Price caps reviewed
1999 Networking the Nation funding in-
creased again ($171 million)
Telecommunications (Consumer
Protection and Services Standards
Act) 1999
2000 Customer Service Guarantee re-
quirements strengthened
Telecommunications Service In-
quiry (Besley)
2001 Further funding allocated for rural
telecommunications development
initiatives ($161 million)
Price caps again reviewed
$25 million contract awarded to
Vodafone to increase mobile phone
coverage on rural highways
$150 million contract awarded to
Telstra to provide untimed calls in
Extended Zones
USO Contestabi l i ty  Pi lots
commenced
ACA commenced review of Cus-
tomer Service Guarantee
4.1 The 1991 Act
Many elements of the pre-1991 arrangements
were carried across to the Telecommunications
Act 1991 and some new provisions were added:
• in the short term Telecom Australia (subse-
quently renamed Telstra) remained the car-
rier responsible for provision of affordable
access to basic telecommunications services
across Australia, on much the same basis as
before;
•  the USO arrangements included only the
standard telephone service (basic voice),
payphones, emergency services, telephone
interpreter services, and certain concessions
to organisations for people with disabilities;
• price cap arrangements were introduced;
•  there was provision for competition in the
delivery of USO services in the longer
term; and
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•  the USO loss incurred by Telstra on the
standard telephone service and emergency
services became industry-funded, based on
a carrier’s share of total telecommunica-
tions revenue in Australia.
Box 4: Standard Universal Service
Obligation arrangements
Telstra is the only carrier with the legal obliga-
tion to provide the standard telephone service
(basic voice) on demand to any customer in
Australia, in accordance with regulated prices.
The existence of price controls gives rise to the
potential for a loss to be incurred in the delivery
of USO services. Without price controls, a USO
provider has the freedom to charge commercial
rates that will enable acceptable rate of return
targets to be achieved in meeting universal ser-
vice obligations, and so to avoid any losses.
The Bellcore model is used to estimate the
losses incurred by Telstra in meeting this obli-
gation.
All licensed carriers contribute to the cost of
reimbursing Telstra’s losses, on a pro-rata basis
that reflects their share of the total telecom-
munications market revenue in Australia.
The ACA estimated that Telstra’s USO losses
for 1999/2000 were $281 million. Telstra funded
76.6 per cent of this cost, Optus 14.4 per cent,
Vodafone 4.3 per cent, AAPT 1.7 per cent and
the remaining carriers 3.0 per cent.11
The decision that the losses incurred by Telstra
in meeting its universal service obligations
would be shared among the telecommunications
carriers brought with it the seeds of significant
change that later developed into a major source
of dispute between carriers. The rationale for
this decision was that Telstra could be commer-
cially disadvantaged, compared to its new com-
petitors, if it had to meet and fully fund its uni-
versal service obligations, and that some form of
                                                      
11 Universal Service Assessment 1999-2000, ACA, 28
March 2001, http://www.aca.gov.au/consumer/uso/1999-
2000assessment_report.pdf
corrective intervention was necessary in order to
achieve commercial equity.
An important input to the new arrangements was
a report in 1989 by the then Bureau of Transport
and Communications Economics (BTCE) that
estimated the size of the loss to be between $240
million and $295 million.12 This was the first
attempt to cost telecommunications service de-
livery in Australia. In quantifying the loss, how-
ever, the report identified further complexities.
For example, the BTCE advocated an avoidable
cost approach, while Telstra argued for a fully
distributed cost approach and estimated the
amount to be $640 million.13 In addition, the re-
port showed that the opportunity cost of capital
had a significant impact on the size of the
estimated loss.
The government accepted the BTCE’s method-
ology and instructed Telecom Australia to use
the avoidable cost approach for its future policy,
strategies and costings for the USO.14 Deter-
mining the size of the loss, and who should fund
it, thus entailed judgements about financial and
commercial aspects of telecommunications
service delivery. A dispute arose between Tel-
stra and its two competitors (Optus and Voda-
fone) about the size of Telstra’s 1993/94 USO
claim. Following negotiations between the carri-
ers, the USO amount for that year was agreed to
be $230 million and the Australian Telecom-
munications Authority was asked to recommend
a more acceptable costing model than that de-
veloped by the BTCE in 1989. As a result, Bell-
core International was engaged in 1996 to build
a fully documented and operational USO cost-
proxy model, upon which future USO claims
could be based. An overview of the costing of
the USO is Appendix 1.
The die was cast, however, for reforms to the
USO arrangements specified in the 1991 Act.
Not only were the new telecommunications car-
riers becoming more involved in the USO de-
bate, but there was also growing dissatisfaction
about the supply of telecommunications services
in rural Australia.
                                                      
12 BTCE, ‘Report No 64: The Cost of Telecom’s
Community Service Obligations’, AGPS, Canberra, 1989,
p84.
13 Communications Law Centre, November 1997, Ch. 4
14 Communications Law Centre, November 1997, Ch 4
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4.2 The 1997 Act
Following a change in government after the
1996 election, the new Minister for Communi-
cations and the Arts, Senator Alston, established
the Standard Telephone Service Review Group
(STSRG)15 with the objective:
to determine whether recent and emerging develop-
ments in telecommunications technology, or increas-
ing demand for more advanced telecommunications
services in the Australian community warrant a
change in the level of service mandated under the
universal service obligation.16
This review, chaired by Jock Given of the
Communications Law Centre, and with repre-
sentatives from academia, consumer groups and
carriers, focused on whether minimum service
levels should be upgraded. A contentious rec-
ommendation was that a digital data capability
should be provided through the USO mechanism
in the event that market forces failed to make
this capability reasonably accessible to all
Australians on an equitable basis. One member
of the review group (Professor Henry Ergas)
lodged a minority report which expressed the
view that the main report ‘greatly over-states the
likely benefits of prescription (of a digital data
capability), while even more greatly under-stat-
ing its costs’.17
The report did not, however, question assump-
tions about natural monopoly conditions, the
need for price controls or basic funding ar-
rangements. While the STSRG advocated pri-
mary reliance on market forces to deliver im-
provements in mobile and digital data services,
and supported opening up the USO to competi-
tion, there was little discussion or evaluation of
whether market conditions had changed suffi-
ciently to merit greater reliance on competition
for the supply of the standard telephone
service.18
                                                      
15 ‘Standard Telephone Service to be reviewed’, Ministerial
media release, 7 July 1996. This and all subsequent media
releases referred to as ‘Ministerial media release’ are
releases of the Minister for Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts and are available at
www.dcita.gov.au.
16 STSRG terms of reference.
17 Standard Telephone Service Review Group, ‘Review of
the Standard Telephone Service’, Department of
Communications and the Arts, Canberra, December 1996.
See also Appendix 2
18 Standard Telephone Service Review Group, December
1996.
While the STSRG report was being finalised, the
Minister announced a new $250 million rural
telecommunications initiative – the Regional
Telecommunications Infrastructure Fund (RTIF)
– which was completely independent of USO ar-
rangements.19 This gave de-facto recognition
that sole reliance on USO arrangements would
not secure desired improvements in rural tele-
communications services. In addition, the RTIF
scheme provided for its funds to be allocated
through competitive tendering processes,
thereby promoting the prospect of a new carrier
entering the rural telecommunications market
and competing against Telstra. This was a sig-
nificant precedent that challenged the previously
accepted natural monopoly assumption.
Nevertheless, the Telecommunications Act 1997
contained no major reforms to existing universal
service arrangements. Its focus, instead, was on
introducing a new industry-specific trade prac-
tices regime and removing limits on the number
of telecommunications carriers that could oper-
ate in Australia.
4.3 The 1999 Act
A watershed came in September 1998 when Tel-
stra lodged a $1.8 billion USO claim. This was a
700 per cent increase on the amount previously
agreed between the carriers, with a correspond-
ing increase in the contributions made by the
other carriers to cover Telstra’s USO losses. The
validity of the claim was strongly contested by
these carriers. In parallel with this, and with an
increasing perception of a digital divide existing
between metropolitan and rural Australia, the
government continued to pursue a rural tele-
communications strategy based on compliance,
prescription and cost subsidisation. Commen-
cing in November 1997 it:
•  introduced a Customer Service Guarantee
(CSG) requiring carriers to meet specified
performance standards;20
•  directed the Australian Communications
Authority (ACA) to conduct an inquiry
specifically into whether the USO should
be upgraded to include a digital data capa-
                                                      
19 ‘Government Announces Regional Telecommunications
Infrastructure Fund’, Ministerial media release, 5
December 1996.
20 ‘Customer Service Guarantee’, Ministerial media release,
10 November 1997.
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bility21 (an overview of including a digital
data capability in the USO is Appendix 2);
•  allocated a further $60 million to the Net-
working the Nation (NtN) program (previ-
ously called the RTIF program),22 with an
additional $171 million being added in De-
cember 199923 (an overview of the NtN
program is Appendix 3);
• retained price cap regulation;24
• capped the USO amount; and25
•  placed a Digital Data Service Obligation
(DDSO) on Telstra, requiring it to make
available an Integrated Services Digital
Network (ISDN) service, on demand, to 96
per cent of the population, and included in
USO arrangements a rebate of up to 50 per
cent (maximum $765 per service) of the
cost of the equipment needed to enable the
remaining 4 per cent of the population to
obtain access to an asynchronous satellite
digital data service – a Special Digital Data
Service Obligation (SDDSO).26
In addition, there was a separate Act specifically
addressing universal service matters, the Tele-
communications (Consumer Protection and
Services Standards) Act 1999.These initiatives
failed to stem the mounting level of consumer
concern about poor rural telecommunications
services and the fear that service performance
would deteriorate even more following the pro-
posed sale of the final tranche of Telstra shares.
What had started out as a relatively straightfor-
ward policy area had become a political mine-
field, with developments requiring sensitive and
deft handling.
4.4 Further initiatives
By the end of 1999, the micro-economic reform
program had failed to satisfy the rural com-
munity. It had also resulted in a greater engage-
                                                      
21 ‘Digital Data Review’, Ministerial media release, 6 May
1998.
22 ‘Government expands funding for Networking the
Nation’, Ministerial media release, 11 July 1998.
23 ‘Government announces $171 million boost to regional
funding’, Ministerial media release, 16 December 1999.
24 ‘Six month extension to Telstra price caps’, Ministerial
media release, 14 December 1998.
25 ‘Government to cap net Universal Service Cost’,
Ministerial media release, 25 March 1999
26 ‘Senate approves better rural phone services, consumer
protection and telecommunications competition’,
Ministerial media release, 22 June 1999
ment by government in the detail of rural tele-
communications services than had previously
occurred. The plans for further privatisation of
Telstra were a particular focus of concern, with
the fear that this would lead to a deterioration in
rural telecommunications services. Compound-
ing this fear were increasing anecdotal accounts
of a ‘digital divide’ between metropolitan and
rural Australia, fuelled by incidents (such as the
closure of the analogue Advanced Mobile Phone
Service (AMPS) system at the end of 2000)
which were seen to disadvantage rural
consumers.27
Box 5: USO contestability
arrangements
The USO contestability arrangements com-
menced in July 2001. In areas nominated by the
ACA, Telstra is the Primary Universal Service
Provider (PUSP) and other carriers can elect to
register as Competing Universal Service Provid-
ers (CUSPs).
A CUSP must supply an ‘Alternate Telecom-
munications Service’ on demand to anyone in
the nominated areas. In return, it receives an
agreed USO subsidy amount for each USO cus-
tomer it signs up.
Telstra, as the PUSP, receives the USO subsidy
for all the customers not signed up by a CUSP
and an additional payment reflecting its carrier
of last resort status in the nominated areas.
All licensed carriers share the cost of the total
subsidy payments, according to their share of
total eligible revenue, as under standard USO
arrangements.
In 2001/02, $34 million out a total of $240 mil-
lion in USO subsidies will be allocated through
USO contestability arrangements.
In response to these developments, the gov-
ernment established the Telecommunications
Service Inquiry (the Besley Inquiry) in March
2000 to assess and make a certification on the
adequacy of rural telecommunications ser-
                                                      
27 ‘Agreement on AMPS phaseout in regional Australia’,
Ministerial media release, 30 November 1998.
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vices.28 In the same year it initiated greater use
of competitive processes by inviting:
• competitive tenders for $150 million for the
provision of untimed local calls in Ex-
tended Zones;29
• competitive tenders for $25 million for pro-
viding improved mobile phone coverage on
nominated rural highways;30 and
•  carrier participation in USO contestability
trials (see Box 5).31
Overviews of the Extended Zones tender and
USO Contestability are in Appendix 4.
The USO contestability trials represented a sig-
nificant shift in strategy. For the first time, USO
subsidies were to be made accessible to carriers
other than Telstra. In addition, the initiatives
contemplated that more than one carrier could
offer the standard telephone service in a nomi-
nated area.
However the government still continued to rely
on more traditional responses. Following the
report of the Besley Inquiry, it allocated an ad-
ditional $163 million for improving telecom-
munications services in rural Australia.32 This
included:
• $50 million for better quality and faster ac-
cess to dial-up Internet services; and
•  $52 million for a National Communication
Fund.
The introduction of competition into the delivery
of USO services, together with the Extended
Zones and Highways tenders, challenged the
assumptions of monopoly, compliance, pre-
scription and cost subsidisation.
                                                      
28 ‘Telecommunications Service Inquiry’, Ministerial
media release, 19 March 2000.
29 ‘Calls for tenders for $150 Million social bonus project’,
Ministerial media release, 23 March 2000. The term
‘Extended Zones’ is used in this paper to describe those
areas (nearly 80% of Australia) that benefited from this
tender. A map showing the Extended Zones is provided in
Appendix 4.
30 ‘$25 Million Mobile Phones on Highways Tender’,
Ministerial media release, 22 August 2000.
31 ‘USO contestability pilot areas announced’, Ministerial
media release, 23 August 2000.
32 ‘Listening and delivering on better regional
telecommunications services’, Ministerial media release, 15
May 2001.
5. Outcomes
The 2001 federal election witnessed vigorous
debate about the possible further privatisation of
Telstra. At the heart of this debate was the un-
challenged view that rural telecommunications
services were not of an acceptable standard, al-
though substantial improvements had been
achieved (see Box 6). For example:
•  all consumers had obtained access to un-
timed local call charges;
• the quality of services had increased;
•  a wider range of services had become
available;
•  implementation, repair and maintenance
standards had improved; and
• the cost of telephony had decreased.
Box 6: Rural telecommunications
services – objectives vs outcomes
1. Senator Alston, Minister for Communications,
Information Technology and the Arts, Media release,
7 July 1996:
The Government is strongly committed to the con-
cept of universal service, which ensures that a
Standard Telephone Service is available to all
Australians on an equitable basis no matter where
they live or work.
2. Standard Telephone Service Review Group,
December 1996:
By the year 2000 ‘a digital data capability’ should
be reasonably accessible to all Australians on an
equitable basis wherever they reside or carry on
business.
3. Telecommunications Service Inquiry, ‘Con-
necting Australia, Report of the Telecommunications
Service Inquiry’, AGPS, Canberra, September 2000,
Executive Summary:
The Inquiry heard the frustrations of many con-
sumers, particularly concentrated in rural and re-
mote Australia, in getting basic and reliable tele-
phone services connected quickly and repaired in a
timely manner. …
Many consumers, again with a greater concentra-
tion in rural and remote Australia, experience slow
data speeds when accessing the Internet. …
It is important from a national perspective that the
existing telecommunications disadvantage experi-
enced by many Australians in rural and remote
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areas is addressed.
4. Productivity Commission, ‘International
Benchmarking of Remote, Rural and Urban
Telecommunications’, Research Report, Aus-
Info, Canberra, July 2001:
One reason for the interest in telecommunications
services in remote and rural areas is the relatively
high cost of provision in these areas and the associ-
ated difficulty in ensuring a quality of service and
price comparable with urban areas.
The shortcomings, however, reflected changing
consumer expectations and the loosely defined
objectives (e.g. affordability, reasonable access,
equity and ubiquity) of the universal service re-
gime. Services rated inadequate in 2001 would
have been welcomed in 1991. For example, ubi-
quitous access to untimed local calls would have
satisfied rural consumers in 1991. By 2001,
when that objective had been achieved, a higher
benchmark of ubiquitous access to untimed
national calls was being advocated by the
Australian Labor Party (ALP) as a basic tele-
communications right.33 Static measures of tele-
communications service standards thus have a
limited shelf life and provide an incomplete
basis for analysing the effectiveness of a rural
telecommunications regime.
In a dynamic industry, arrangements are needed
that motivate a telecommunications carrier to
make continual improvements in service levels
in response to changing consumer expectations,
without relying on regular government interven-
tion to upgrade minimum standards.
5.1 Monopoly entrenchment
The universal service regime was introduced as
a substitute for market forces, to ensure the de-
livery of minimum services to end users. Natural
monopoly assumptions led to Telstra being the
only licensed carrier entitled to be subsidised to
provide services in rural areas –at least $1,353
million over five years. Other carriers could not
have competed against the subsidised Telstra in
rural markets, unless they had significantly
lower cost structures.
                                                      
33 Australian Labor Party, Knowledge Nation, July 2001, p.
41.
Box 7: Rural telecommunications
subsidies
Scheme Subsidy Beneficiary
Telstra Other
carriers
Industry
funded
USO 1997/98 $523m
USO 1998/99 $280m
USO 1999/00 $281m
USO 2000/01 $299m
USO 2001/02 $240m
Subtotal $1,353m $1,353m
Government
funded
NtN $481m $32m +
Besley $163m ?
Extended
Zones
$150m $150m
Highways $25m $25m
Subtotal $819m
TOTAL $2,172m $1,535m + $25m
Sources: ACA reports and Ministerial media
statements
Of a total of $819 million in rural telecom-
munications federal grants, little more than $25
million has been allocated to carriers other than
Telstra.34 In the same period, Telstra won the
$150 million tender for providing untimed local
calls in Extended Zones and benefited exten-
sively from funds allocated through NtN for
rural telecommunications infrastructure devel-
opment projects.35 See Box 7.
In addition, the CSG deterred competition. Re-
sponding to a Besley Inquiry recommendation
that ‘the Customer Service Guarantee be
amended to apply only to Universal Service
                                                      
34 Vodafone won the tender for $25m to provide mobile
phone coverage on nominated rural highways.
35 For instance, Telstra has been the prime carrier
beneficiary of $32.2m allocated for 88 mobile phone
projects across Australia.
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Providers’,36 the ACA released a discussion pa-
per on the CSG in which it recorded comments
by both Telstra and Optus that described the
CSG as a barrier to market entry.37 The universal
service regime thus discouraged new carriers
from entering the rural telecommunications
market.
5.2 Service minimisation
In the absence of competition, there is little
commercial incentive for a carrier to supply
more than the minimum service required by
law– or even to meet minimum requirements.
For example, if Telstra had decided to provide a
higher level of service when the opportunity cost
of doing so exceeded any resulting marginal
benefit, it could have been in breach of its obli-
gation to shareholders to maximise its return on
investment funds.
A failure to increase investment in a monopoly
market would have been of minimal commercial
consequence, as there would be no risk of losing
market share. On the other hand, the opportunity
cost of transferring scarce investment funds
from a competitive market to that monopoly
market could have been a loss of market share
and revenue in the competitive market.
As reported by the ACA, the reality appears to
have been that Telstra’s rural customers experi-
enced less than the prescribed minimum service
levels, with the ACA reporting a continuing
failure by carriers to meet the CSG standards for
new connections and fault reporting; although
the ACA reported this under the heading ‘Major
Carriers Perform Well’.38 The pecuniary penal-
ties for sub-standard performance were appar-
ently insufficient to motivate Telstra to achieve
the minimum standards. This suggests that the
specification of minimum performance stand-
ards (and the associated penalties for not meet-
ing those standards) has not been an effective
                                                      
36 Telecommunications Service Inquiry, September 2000,
Recommendation 5.
37 ACA, ‘Review of the Telecommunications Customer
Service Guarantee’, AusInfo, Canberra,
http://www.aca.gov.au/consumer/csg/csgreview2001_dp.ht
m, September 2001, paragraph 6.28.
38 ACA, ‘Major Carriers Perform Well’, Media
Release on Telecommunications Performance Monitoring
Bulletin for the June 2001 quarter, 24 September 2001.
This and all subsequent media releases referred to as ‘ACA
media release’ are available at www.aca.gov.au.
tool for ensuring a prescribed level of service in
a competitive market.
5.3 Resource diversion
Until the introduction of USO contestability, the
only method available to carriers other than Tel-
stra for controlling their USO costs was through
the design and application of the Bellcore
model. As Telstra’s claim for USO losses in-
curred in 1997/98 would have increased the car-
riers’ USO costs eightfold, the claim, and the
methodology on which it was based, became the
subject of intense carrier scrutiny. Cost alloca-
tion is complex at the best of times. When it in-
volves substantial payments, that very com-
plexity can be used to obfuscate and delay the
finalisation of any such payments.
After three years of extensive debate, submis-
sions and expert advice, the Minister set the
USO amount for 2001/02 at $240 million39. In
real terms, this was less than the $295 million
estimated by the BTCE twelve years earlier to
be the maximum cost for the USO in 1989.
The opportunity cost to the public of this status-
quo outcome was high. Scarce carrier resources
diverted into a very complex and contentious
technical debate on the cost of supplying rural
services could instead have been directed to-
wards implementing service improvements.
Other initiatives also had high costs. For exam-
ple, the NtN program required substantial input
from local communities to prepare grant propo-
sals, from public servants to assess all proposals
and from carriers to submit tenders. Similarly,
the enforcement of CSG standards involved ex-
tensive ACA monitoring, industry reporting and
compliance procedures.
The reliance on cost-proxy models, performance
monitoring and one-off grants tied up resources
that might otherwise have been allocated more
beneficially to additional rural tele-
communications development projects.
5.4 Consumer dissatisfaction
The impact of these dysfunctional outcomes can
be measured both by the public debate sur-
                                                      
39 ‘USO subsidies secured for the next three years’,
Ministerial media release, 2 October 2001.
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rounding the further privatisation of Telstra and
the evidence of the official inquiries:
Of particular note is the greater degree of concern
expressed by rural and remote Australians about ser-
vice levels compared with those in metropolitan
areas. . . . The Inquiry heard the frustration of many
customers, particularly concentrated in rural and re-
mote Australia, in getting basic and reliable telephone
services connected quickly and repaired in a timely
manner.40
Australian rural and remote telecommunications
users experience some disadvantages compared with
urban users . . .41
Complementing this, the number of Ministerial
media releases relating to rural telecommunica-
tions matters almost quadrupled from the first
three years of the Howard Government to the
three years to September 2001.42 This suggested
an increase in political focus on rural telecom-
munications issues, in response the political im-
peratives mentioned earlier, and associated con-
sumer dissatisfaction.
5.5 The scope for improvement
These outcomes lead to the conclusion that there
is scope for improvement in regulatory arrange-
ments, noting that the principles underlying the
current regime were based on views about the
market that prevailed in the late 1980s. Since
those principles were adopted, technology costs
have reduced, consumer expectations have in-
creased and the market has experienced dynamic
and continuing change.
While the level and quality of rural telecom-
munications services achieved in 2001 might
have satisfied consumers in 1991, the regulatory
framework has been inadequate to ensure that
                                                      
40 Telecommunications Services Inquiry, September 2000,
Executive Summary.
41 Productivity Commission, ‘Remote, Rural and Urban
Telecommunications’, Media release,
http://www.pc.gov.au/research/benchmrk/rarts/finalreport/
mediarelease.html, July 2001.
42 In the first Howard Ministry, an estimated 19 per cent
(35 of 181) of media releases by Senator Alston related to
rural telecommunications matters. In the second Howard
Ministry, an estimated 36 per cent (112 of 312) of media
releases by Senator Alston related to rural
telecommunications matters; in addition, an estimated 26
per cent (22 of 83) of media releases by Senator Campbell
(Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for
Communications, Information Technology and the Arts)
related to rural telecommunications matters.
carrier performance kept pace with consumer
expectations. Tinkering with the regulatory
approach did not fix the problem – and is un-
likely to in the future.
6. The opportunity for
change
From a commercial perspective (see Box 8),
there are compelling reasons why the rural tele-
communications market could attract greater
interest from carriers:
•  consumers in rural Australia value tele-
communications services highly. The ACA
assessed that, for 1997/98, in the most re-
mote areas of Australia the average revenue
per service in operation was $1,676.51,
compared to an average revenue of $666.46
in built-up areas;43
• there is a viable opportunity for a new car-
rier to achieve competitive differentiation
through offering improved service levels,
given consumer dissatisfaction with current
service levels;
•  compared to the highly contested metro-
politan markets, most rural markets have
only one telecommunications network, that
of Telstra; and
•  USO subsidies provide a unique additional
revenue source that would also result in a
reduction in a carrier’s net USO levy
contribution.
The single most significant factor discouraging
the competitive supply of telecommunications
services in rural Australia is cost. In this area
also, there have been major changes:
•  improvements in technology have reduced
costs. This is reflected in a significant re-
duction in the size of the USO amount in
the 14 years since the first BTCE estimate:
down from $295 million in 1989, to $231
million set for 2003/0444;
•  technology and service convergence pro-
vides opportunities to exploit economies of
scope and new revenue streams. Interactive
television, wireless delivery of fixed and
                                                      
43 ACA, Net Universal Service Cost Assessment for 1997-
98’, AGPS, Canberra,
http://www.aca.gov.au/issues/report/NUSC_FAssess1997-
98.htm , October 1999, p. 118.
44 ‘USO subsidies secured for the next three years’,
Ministerial media release, 2 October 2001.
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mobile services, broadband infrastructure
carrying both telecommunications and
broadcasting services, internet telephony
and integrated communications services
earning new advertising and transaction-
based revenues will all contribute to the
achievement of cost-efficiencies and the
delivery of improved benefits to consumers;
and
• carrier funding of the USO amount could be
used to promote the competitive supply of
rural telecommunications services.
Box 8: Rural telecommunications –
a commercially viable market
• Demand exceeds supply
• Revenue per rural customer >> revenue per
metropolitan customer
•  USO subsidies provide a unique additional
revenue source
• Limited competition
•  Carriers can exploit economies of scope
resulting from technical and service
convergence
The greater commercial attractiveness of the
rural telecommunications market and the reduc-
tion in technology costs represent a significant
change from the environment that existed in
1987. Given this, and continuing dissatisfaction
with rural telecommunications services, it is
timely to examine the options for regulatory
reform.
6.1 Theoretical foundations
Debate on universal service matters gave rise to
numerous studies commissioned by the federal
government45 and submissions to various USO
discussion papers and Senate inquiries. Despite
this, there was little objective, in-depth, inde-
pendent research that examined universal ser-
vice arrangements from first principles and
could provide a substantive foundation for
reform.
                                                      
45 For example, the ACA engaged Gibson Quai, Ovum and
The Allen Consulting Group to advise on various USO
costing matters and the Department of Communications,
Information Technology and the Arts engaged KPMG to
advise on USO reform options – although this report was
never made public.
Richard Joseph has suggested that ‘since 1975,
there has been a steady erosion in the concept of
universal service in Australia’, attributing this to
a ‘slavish adherence to efficiency’.46 He does
not, however, reconcile this with the improve-
ment in telecommunications services that rural
consumers have actually experienced over that
time, nor does he propose specific changes to
universal service arrangements.
On the other hand, economic theorists such as
Laffont and Tirole have advocated the need for a
new paradigm for universal service, recognising
that it is ‘a central issue in the political debate
surrounding regulatory reform in all network in-
dustries’ and that the ‘mechanism of cross-
subsidies is coming to an end in developed
countries’.47 They discuss two models for the
competitively neutral provision of universal ser-
vice: cost-proxy models and auctions. However,
they do not discuss whether the evolving tele-
communications market actually diminishes the
need for any intervention strategy in the first
place.48
There have been many initiatives announced in
Australia, but none have been supported by any
systematic re-evaluation of the policy frame-
work. This creates the danger of ad hoc, patch-
work responses which are more politically
driven than cost-effective.
Regulatory intervention has to date been com-
pliance-focused and reactive, directed at the
supply side of the industry. There is no compel-
ling evidence, however, to confirm that con-
tinued reliance on this strategy into the future
will be effective in reducing this gap; or in pre-
venting the gap from becoming wider as the
communications industry continues to change
rapidly. Public attention continues to focus on
shortcomings in the range, quality and cost of
rural telecommunications services, despite new
initiatives being announced on a regular basis.
With this changing telecommunications market,
there is an opportunity to review regulatory
intervention strategies and to examine the alter-
                                                      
46 R. A. Joseph, ‘The craze for efficiency: universal service
in Australian communications’, The Journal of Policy,
Regulation and Strategy for Telecommunications and
Media, vol. 3, no. 1, February 2001, pp 73 & 81.
47 J-J Laffont and J Tirole, Competition in
Telecommunications, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000, p
218.
48 Laffont and Tirole, Ch. 6.
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natives for promoting improvements in tele-
communications services in rural Australia.
Three options are examined: regulatory com-
pliance, incentives and laissez-faire.
6.2 Regulatory compliance
This is the current approach. Four main regula-
tory levers are available for influencing the de-
livery of rural telecommunications services:
government direction; ownership of Telstra; the
USO scheme; and general regulatory provisions.
Government direction was the primary lever pre-
1975 when the PMG, as a department of state,
had responsibility for telecommunications ser-
vices. This meant that government had first-
hand involvement in the provision of telecom-
munications services.
Ownership of Telstra has already been men-
tioned. In public debate this has been advocated
as a means of protecting and improving the
quality of rural telecommunications services.
Neither option is worth further close consider-
ation in the absence of determination by the
government to achieve real change. Putting to
one side the political controversy surrounding
Telstra privatisation, neither major political
party has advocated that Telstra should be di-
rected to operate on a non-commercial basis, or
explained how it would use public ownership of
Telstra to improve better implementation of uni-
versal service objectives.
For example, the Shadow Minister stated in Au-
gust 2001: ‘The only way in which Telstra can
be forced to make uneconomic decisions is if the
Government of the day directs the Board. Labor
will not direct the Board.’49 Similarly Senator
Alston, the Minister, said one month later: ‘The
truth is that services are guaranteed by law under
the Universal Service Obligation (USO), Cus-
tomer Service Guarantee (CSG) and price caps
legislation, regardless of the ownership of
Telstra.’50
Currently, the primary lever is the USO Scheme.
At a cost to the industry of $1,353 over the five
year period 1997/98 to 2001/02, the USO
                                                      
49 Stephen Smith MP, Shadow Minister for
Communications, ‘Telstra and Australia’s Broadband
Future’, a paper presented to SPAN General Meeting,
Sydney, 1 August 2001, p11.
50 ‘Warning’, Ministerial media release, 5 September 2001.
scheme is the single biggest regulatory initiative
focusing on rural telecommunications services.51
The need for the USO scheme is due, in part, to
the existence of another regulatory compliance
mechanism – price caps. Without price regula-
tion, it would be possible for Telstra to recoup
from its tariffs any losses it incurred in meeting
its statutory obligation to provide the standard
telephone service. As the ACA has indicated,
the existence of the price caps means that there
would be no service without the subsidy: ‘in the
absence of the USO, Telstra would not provide
service to NLAs (net loss areas)’.52
Other general regulatory compliance measures
include the CSG, the DDSO and the SDDSO,
mentioned earlier.
The use of these measures implies that carriers
will not voluntarily increase performance levels
to give consumers ‘reasonable access, on an
equitable basis, to standard telephone services ...
and digital data services’.53 They also give gov-
ernment dynamic control over minimum service
standards. At a time of concern about service
levels in rural Australia, having the ability to
require improved services has its political ad-
vantages. But this can be a double-edged sword.
In the first place it requires an ongoing interven-
tionist role for the government in a sector where
government is generally seeking to place greater
reliance on industry self-regulation and out-
sourcing tasks previously undertaken by the fed-
eral government. There are therefore regulatory
costs and inefficiencies.
Secondly, the greater the involvement of gov-
ernment in a sector where consumer expecta-
tions are constantly increasing, the longer it may
take for services to improve. For example, the
Minister did not place the DDSO licence condi-
tion on Telstra until two years after he sought
advice from the STSRG about upgrading the
standard telephone service. Consultation obliga-
tions, legislative requirements and bureaucratic
processes all constrain timely remedial action,
particularly where an issue is politically
sensitive.
                                                      
51 The next largest funding allocation is the five year NtN
program, to which a total of $481 million has been
allocated.
52 ACA, ‘Net Universal Service Cost Assessment for 1997-
98’, October 1999, p14
53 This is the main object of the regime. See footnote 8.
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In addition, direct government involvement can
foster a cargo-cult mentality regarding im-
provements in rural telecommunications ser-
vices, which results in a significant drain on the
public purse, and discourages innovative solu-
tions that might deliver faster and more benefi-
cial results.
In the context of a dynamic industry, where con-
sumer expectations about telecommunications
rights have increased over the last five years,
and for reasons of cost and timeliness, options
other than regulatory compliance should be
examined. This is beginning to occur. As men-
tioned elsewhere, recent initiatives include the
introduction of USO contestability pilot trials
and the allocation of $819 million in funding
incentives.
6.3 Incentives
An incentives approach is different to a compli-
ance approach in a number of ways. For
example:
•  It rewards good performance rather than
penalising poor performance. In the USO
contestability trials, a Competing Universal
Service Provider (CUSP) is only paid a
subsidy for a customer if it provides a suffi-
ciently good service to attract that customer
to sign up in the first place. This contrasts
with CSG arrangements, where a pecuniary
penalty is imposed if a carrier fails to meet
prescribed standards.
•  It empowers consumer choice in place of
third party prescription of minimum service
levels. In the USO contestability trials,
CUSPs can be expected to offer consumers
services that go beyond minimum service
levels in order to attract customers and
thereby gain their USO subsidy as new
revenue.
•  It facilitates the achievement of higher
service targets rather than the acceptance
of lowest common denominator perform-
ance. As part of its successful Extended
Zones tender for ubiquitous access to un-
timed local calls, Telstra included a com-
mitment to supply a minimum dial-up in-
ternet access speed of 14.4 kbps, above the
2.4 kbps defined in the ACA’s ‘End-to-end
Network Performance Standard’.
A range of incentives can influence carrier be-
haviour: regulatory commitments; access to
funding; franchise specification; and company
endorsement.
The first of these, regulatory commitments,
were used in the selection of new licensed
Australian carriers, Optus and Vodafone, in
1991 and 1992 respectively. In these tender pro-
cesses, the government negotiated contractual
undertakings about network roll-out, industry
development and service offerings in return for
government commitments about future regula-
tion. These commitments included: not licensing
more carriers before 1 July 1997, a shut-down of
the analogue AMPS system by 1 January 2000,
a fast-track planning process for infrastructure
roll-out, and an industry-specific competition
law.
Significantly, the carrier undertakings were
voluntary, rather than imposed by the gov-
ernment. While there has been no independent
evaluation of whether the carriers have met all
of their contractual commitments, competitive
pressures have resulted in some commitments
being met earlier than originally agreed (e.g.
network roll-out).
The federal government also raised the possi-
bility of using incentives to influence carrier be-
haviour following a High Court ruling forcing
Foxtel to provide open access through its set-top
boxes. In response to a pay TV player express-
ing concern that it would have to provide access
at potentially uncommercial rates, the Minister
was reported as saying that if uncertainty on
investment returns precluded digital upgrades,
‘we will have to find sufficient incentives.’54
The control of access to funding has been used
extensively since 1997. As indicated above, the
government committed over $819 million in the
five year period from 1997/98 to 2001/02
through competitive allocation processes to im-
prove rural telecommunications services. In ad-
dition to this, in 2001 it opened up access to the
USO subsidies in Extended Zones (worth $35
million in 2001/02) and in the USO contesta-
bility pilot areas (worth $37 million in
2001/02).55
                                                      
54 ‘Government steps in to allay Foxtel fears’, The
Australian, 15 August 2001, p. 35.
55 ACA, ‘Advice to the Minister New USO Arrangements’,
AusInfo, Canberra,
http://www.aca.gov.au/consumer/uso/Report%20on%2020
00-03%20-%20Final.pdf September 2000, p. 3.
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As occurred in the tender process for selecting
the new telecommunications carriers in 1991
and 1992, the Extended Zones tender resulted in
Telstra, the successful tenderer, volunteering
commitments that went beyond minimum ser-
vice level obligations: a minimum dial-up Inter-
net speed of 14.4 kbps (with 19.2 kbps or higher
being available to as large a proportion of cus-
tomers as possible); an optional ‘always on’ sat-
ellite-based Internet service; and untimed local
call access to at least one Internet Service Pro-
vider (ISP), regardless of where the call
originated.56
Similarly, a better than minimum outcome was
achieved when Vodafone won the tender for
providing mobile coverage on rural highways.
Rural customers were expected to benefit from a
greater duplication of mobile coverage along
these highways, as Vodafone had more coverage
gaps to fill than Telstra. The Minister said that
‘many more people in rural Australia will have
access to an alternative network - providing a
boost to competition in the regions.’57 In both
these competitive processes, the commitments
made by the winning tenderers were under-
pinned by contractual, rather than regulatory,
obligations.
The government used franchise specification to
achieve specific policy objectives in the alloca-
tion of radiofrequency spectrum for 3G wireless
services: licensing of new entrants and revenue
targets. To this end, the commercial attractive-
ness of the licences was increased by decisions
made about national or regional spectrum licen-
ces, the allocation methodology, the licence pe-
riod, spectrum caps, timing, bandwidth, reserve
price, licence conditions and the total amount of
spectrum to be made available.
Finally, company endorsement by government
has been a long-standing strategy for promoting
industry development. In return for a company
committing to a certain level of industry devel-
opment activity in Australia, the government
gives public recognition to that company. It Au-
gust 2001, there were 73 companies participat-
ing in the Partnership for Development program,
with more than $4.2 billion spent on research
and development and $15.9 billion in exports
                                                      
56 ‘Untimed local calls for remote and rural Australia’,
Ministerial media release, 14 February 2001.
57 ‘Extended mobile phone coverage on highways’,
Ministerial media release, 28 February 2001.
reported to date,58 although it is arguable what
proportions of these outcomes are directly at-
tributable to the program.
At the end of a list of the potential advantages of
an incentive-based approach, some of the disad-
vantages or challenges should be mentioned.
These include the opportunities for the promo-
tion of political self-interest, such as through the
allocation of grants for telecommunications
infrastructure development (e.g. NtN) – a
throwback to PMG days when rural telecom-
munications services were closely aligned with
political interests; and for revenue collection to
dominate the agenda of the government and
regulator at the expense of improving services;
for example the spectrum auctions, which si-
phoned funds out of the communications sector.
More fundamentally, an incentives approach
requires active planning and decision-making by
a federal government body. For the incentives to
fulfil their promise, an official entity is required
to take command of an overall plan and imple-
ment it with energy and consistency. To mention
a few examples, some entity is required to man-
age tender processes, to negotiate with tenderers,
to consult communities, to assess the value of
their offerings, to define the geographic areas in
which competition will operate, and to distribute
large sums of public and industry funds. This
kind of hands-on decision-making has been out
of fashion in the federal sphere in recent years. It
is practised with considerable success in count-
ries such as Singapore and Korea, but in Austra-
lia the fashion is for all government bodies to be
classified as regulators and confined to narrow
roles. The question is whether the federal par-
liament and the executive government would be
prepared to clothe the ACA, or any new entity,
with sufficient freedom and authority to admin-
ister an incentive-based scheme.
6.4 Laissez-faire
The main feature of a laissez-faire approach is
reliance on the operation of the marketplace to
deliver a desired outcome. This potential exists
within the telecommunications sector where re-
ducing technology costs and increasing cus-
tomer demand could lead to sustainable
competition.
                                                      
58 ‘Symantec Australia receives national recognition’,
Ministerial media release, 7 August 2001.
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This strategy has several advantages over the
others as it keeps regulatory costs to a minimum,
and does not require an active administrator of
planner, as the incentives approach does. It also
reduces dysfunctional outcomes and is sensitive
to customer needs. It was, for example, the strat-
egy preferred by the STSRG in its recommen-
dation not to mandate the provision of mobile
services.
Whilst this strategy offers many opportunities
for improving basic telecommunications ser-
vices in rural Australia, there is little support for
it on either side of politics. The further privati-
sation of Telstra, continuing complaints about
Telstra’s performance in rural Australia, the
electoral significance of the rural constituency,
growing public antipathy to economic ration-
alism and an emphasis on the existence of a
digital divide all militate against this strategy.
In addition, there is no conclusive evidence that
the telecommunications market in rural Austra-
lia is able to sustain a substantial competitor to
Telstra on a commercially viable basis. While
licences have been issued for a number of re-
gional telecommunications carriers, it remains to
be seen what market share they will win, and
whether this will be sufficient for their long-
term viability. Unfortunately, the recent down-
turn in the telecommunications market has done
little for their prospects.
Further, there is insufficient independent, rigor-
ous and objective economic analysis to counter
the common perception that the provision of
telecommunications services in rural Australia is
a natural monopoly.
It is therefore difficult to be confident that a lais-
sez-faire approach would deliver the desired
objectives sufficiently well for adoption by the
government in a sensitive policy environment.
The political risks of a perceived failure in rural
telecommunications policy are high; and the
political gains of any such change are likely to
be small in the short term.
7. Options for change
Regulatory reform of this area seems overdue in
Australia and overseas (see Box 9). In a perfect
market, a laissez-faire approach should be the
strategy of choice. However, given lack of po-
litical support for it and the need for rural tele-
communications to mature further, an incen-
tives-based approach may provide the most
realistic avenue for a transition towards the
laissez-faire ideal. The government has several
incentives at its disposal:
• activation of a further $170 million per an-
num in USO payments as performance
rewards;
• empowerment of consumers to respond in a
commercial way to poor carrier service;
•  integration of subsidies across the tele-
communications sector to promote inte-
grated service solutions; and
•  use of USO industry funding arrangements
to encourage competing universal service
providers to enter the market.
In addition, the sector is sufficiently robust for a
government body to be more pro-active in set-
ting targets to be reached over time, rather than
setting minimum benchmarks to be met by uni-
versal service providers. In setting a vision and
providing incentives, the government can pro-
mote improvements in service levels, and re-
place compliance measures that constrain the
ability of carriers to exploit the opportunities
thrown up by technological change.
A reliance on incentives requires the assump-
tions about natural monopoly, compliance, pre-
scription and cost subsidisation to be replaced.
This is consistent with the trend in recent devel-
opments in rural telecommunications, as dis-
cussed earlier:
•  tenders encompassed the possibility of
multiple carriers in rural Australia;
•  CUSPs are not subject to price regulation
(e.g. untimed local calls);
•  commercially negotiated contracts have
specified higher than minimum telecom-
munications service levels; and
•  financial incentives have stimulated service
improvements.
Box 9: Overseas experience
The issues faced in Australia are not unique, nor
are the solutions. The Chairman of the FCC has
said:
Universal service has been very successful in bring-
ing telephone services to all Americans, and narrow-
band Internet services as well. Yet the program we
steward today was constructed on a monopoly envi-
ronment. It was an outgrowth of that turn of the cen-
tury marriage between Ma Bell and Uncle Sam. It has
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also proven to be an under-appreciated obstacle to
bringing competitive service to all Americans. I think
we have a golden opportunity with broadband to de-
ploy new services to all Americans, while ensuring
proper economic principles are preserved, so that
those services are low priced, competitive and
innovative.59
The award of the Extended Zones tender to Tel-
stra in 2001 provides prima facie evidence that
rural telecommunications is viewed as a com-
mercially attractive market in its own right. In
contract negotiations, Telstra committed to this
market without any guarantee of being the sole
universal service provider for more than three
years. Its business plan could not make assump-
tions beyond the 2003/04 financial year about
either exclusive access to the USO subsidies in
this market, or maintenance of the size of the
USO subsidies.
In addition, in this process tenderers developed
commercial business plans that covered the least
densely populated areas of Australia, without
any certainty of continuing monopoly access to
USO subsidies beyond three years. This points
to the likelihood that more densely populated
areas in rural Australia could also support the
competitive supply of services.
With regard to financial incentives, in the five
year period 1997/98 to 2001/02, of an estimated
$2,172 million allocated for funding rural tele-
communications services, up to $888 million60
has been allocated through competitive pro-
cesses as incentives for carriers to deliver im-
proved rural telecommunications services. In
this five year period, 40 per cent of funding for
rural telecommunications improvements will
have been competitively allocated, whereas none
was competitively allocated in the previous five
years of competition.
A de facto shift is occurring in rural telecom-
munications policy, but with no systematic justi-
fication. In response to this, the following
                                                      
59 Remarks of Michael K. Powell, Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) at the National Summit on Broadband
Deployment, Washington, D.C. October 25, 2001
<http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2001/spmkp110.htm
l>http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2001/spmkp110.ht
ml.
60 $35m (Extended Zones USO subsidy); $34m (USO
Contestability pilots); $481m NtN; $163m Besley; $150m
Extended Zones; $25m rural highways.
suggested initiatives are based on the principles
of industry convergence, competitive processes,
consumer power and industry incentives.
7.1 A new benchmark
Historically, access to untimed local calls has
been a benchmark for ‘reasonable access on an
equitable basis, to the standard telephone ser-
vice’. Its realisation61 raised the question of
whether it should be upgraded, as a precursor to
any reform of rural telecommunications regula-
tory provisions.
In 2001, the ALP proposed a new benchmark – a
single national call zone, building on a con-
sumer’s right of access to an untimed local call
tariff. This extended a trend in pricing strategy
already being pursued by telcos (e.g. capped
long distance call rates; one charging zone for
mobile services; untimed local call internet ac-
cess from anywhere in Australia). It also built on
new revenue streams (transactions and adver-
tising) and new technology (Voice over Internet
Protocol). Another proposed benchmark was
ubiquitous untimed local call access to high
speed broadband services.
In common with many other initiatives, these
proposals were not costed,62 but suggested as
possible targets against which specific rural
telecommunications initiatives and the technical
manipulation of USO arrangements could be
implemented.
7.2 Reducing unnecessary
duplication
There is little rationale for more than one carrier
(the PUSP) to be obligated to supply the stan-
dard telephone service. Provided all consumers
have access to this service, then other carriers
should not be obliged to duplicate it. It is for
consumers to select the service that best meets
their needs. A competitor can always elect to
offer this service if there is demand for it.
                                                      
61 As a consequence of the success of the Extended Zones
tender.
62 No cost-benefit analyses were provided, for example, for
the Extended Zones and mobile phone coverage on
highways tenders, CSG initiatives, price controls, the
rebate on equipment for the digital data asynchronous
satellite service or the NtN program.
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This approach avoids inefficient duplication,
increases the scope for tailoring services to meet
consumer preferences and ensures that a con-
sumer’s basic telecommunications rights are
met.
7.3 Contested allocation of
subsidies
The success of the Extended Zones tender casts
doubt on whether natural monopoly conditions
still apply to the delivery of rural telecommuni-
cations services. This ‘winner takes all’ contest-
able allocation of subsidies could also be applied
to other less remote USO areas. Alternatively,
the USO contestability approach could be
adopted.
Either way, the government could use competi-
tive processes to secure improvements in rural
telecommunications services, by exploiting car-
rier interest in access to the $170 million in USO
subsidies paid annually to Telstra on an uncon-
tested basis.
This choice would also allow an affected com-
munity to be consulted about which competitive
process should be adopted in its area.
7.4 Integrated allocation of
subsidies
Until recently, there was little integration of the
various subsidies available for funding rural
telecommunications services. This changed with
the $150 million Extended Zones tender, as it
included exclusive access for three years to the
USO subsidies in those areas. In addition, only
CUSPs are eligible to receive Building Addi-
tional Rural Networks (BARN) funding for
projects delivering new networks in the areas in
which they are registered.63
On the other hand, while GSM has been as-
sessed to be the most economical solution for
the supply of the standard telephone service in
some rural areas,64 no allowance has been made
                                                      
63 ‘High speed regional networks on the fast track’,
Ministerial media release, 12 September 2001.
64 Gibson Quai Pty Ltd, ‘USO forward looking
technologies for 1998/99 and 1999/2000’, AGPS,
Canberra,
http://www.aca.gov.au/consumer/uso/usotechnology_report
.pdf January 2000, p. 56.
for this in the assessment of applications for NtN
grants for mobile telephony in those areas.
Allowing only CUSPs to receive grants for
infrastructure development would increase the
incentive for a carrier to register as a CUSP, and
promote the competitive supply of services, to
the long-term benefit of the consumer.
7.5 Strengthening USO
contestability
In the USO debate, interested parties took posi-
tions that reflected whether they had a net USO
levy credit (Telstra) or a net USO levy debit (all
other carriers). These positions were presented
in technical debates about issues such as the cost
of capital, the most cost-effective technology,
statistical sampling techniques and the meas-
urement of intangible benefits. One factor lack-
ing in the debate was commercial discipline: just
as Telstra had little incentive to agree to a re-
duction in cost estimates, so the other carriers
had little incentive to agree to an increase in cost
estimates.
A strategy of increasing the subsidy amount un-
til there is competition in a USO contestability
area, as outlined in Appendix 5, could defuse
these debates by forcing commercial judgements
to be made by all parties about being a universal
service provider. In this situation, the subsidy
would no longer be a reimbursement of a loss.
Instead it would become an incentive to provide
a service, with those choosing not to provide a
service making the judgement that the loss they
might incur in providing the service would be
greater than the cost of the USO levy to subsi-
dise another carrier to provide the service.
This strategy of increasing the USO subsidy to
establish competition in the provision of services
would lead to a more equitable sharing between
carriers of the USO losses incurred by Telstra or
an increase in the range of services offered to
consumers. Both outcomes are desirable:
(i) If the USO subsidy amount is less than
the loss incurred by Telstra in providing
the standard telephone service, then Tel-
stra would fund both its pro-rata share of
the total subsidy and the difference be-
tween its total loss and the total subsidy.
An increase in the USO subsidy would
reduce this inequitable distribution be-
tween carriers of USO losses.
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(ii) If the USO subsidy amount is greater than
the loss incurred by Telstra, then Telstra
would benefit from a windfall gain, at the
expense of its competitors. This would be
inequitable if Telstra had exclusive access
to the subsidy – as indeed was the case in
Telstra’s 1997/98 $1.8 billion USO claim.
By opening up the subsidy to competition,
however, consumers would benefit from
having access to a choice of service pro-
vider and service offerings and, as out-
lined in Appendix 5, the scheme could as-
sist a regional carrier to enter its local
market. The issue in this case is whether
the additional cost of establishing compe-
tition is justified by the consumer benefits
it generates.
This need not result in a significant escalation of
costs. The ‘Extended Zones’ approach could be
substituted for a ‘contestable area’ approach
when the USO subsidy levels reached a pre-
determined limit. Instead of inviting carriers to
register as a CUSP in an area, the government
could invite competitive tenders to be the PUSP
in the area, with exclusive access to USO subsi-
dies for the next three years.
7.6 Carrier funding
As discussed earlier, the eightfold increase in the
USO amount claimed by Telstra for 1997/98
motivated carriers to re-engage in the USO de-
bate, as it was carriers who had to meet the cost
of this increase. If the Commonwealth had
funded the amount, there may still have been
concerns expressed about Telstra gaining an un-
fair competitive advantage through exclusive
access to substantial funds, but the commercial
impact on other carriers would have been far
less.
Commonwealth funding would also reduce the
commercial incentive to become a CUSP, as
other carriers would then have no USO debt that
would be reduced as a result of becoming a
CUSP. Consequently, the prospect of a CUSP
registering in a USO contestability area would
be enhanced by a carrier funding arrangement.
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Appendix 1: costing the USO
The Bellcore cost proxy model formed the basis
of Telstra’s September 1998 claim for reim-
bursement of $1.8 billion in USO losses that
Telstra estimated it incurred in 1997/98.65 This
represented a sevenfold increase on its claim for
$251 million for the previous year.66 The model
used a ‘green fields’ approach, based on:
•  the cost of building from scratch the most
cost-efficient infrastructure to deliver the
required service; and
• exclusive access to the USO subsidy.
This approach was agreed between the ACA,
Optus, Telstra and Vodafone, and provided the
foundation for the Minister to cap the USO
amount. There was some disagreement about
some of the data values used as inputs to the
Bellcore model for calculating Telstra’s losses in
meeting its statutory universal service obliga-
tions. However, there was general industry con-
sensus on the conceptual approach.
Following the lodgement of Telstra’s claim, the
government moved swiftly to cap the USO
amount for 1997/98, saying that:
If the Government had not acted, the industry would
be facing great instability due to this threat of a mas-
sive increase in its USO contributions67
The claim triggered lengthy debate centred on
the validity of the Bellcore model and the value
of the data input to the model. Predictably, key
protagonists in the debate lined up according to
whether they had a net USO credit (Telstra) or a
net USO debit (Vodafone, Cable & Wireless
Optus, AAPT, Hutchison and other carriers),
with the former supporting a high value for the
total USO amount and the latter arguing for a
reduction in the total USO amount.
Following an extensive consultation process that
lasted more than a year, the ACA released its
                                                      
65 Senate Committee on Environment, Communications,
Information Technology and the Arts, ‘Report on
Telecommunications Laws Amendment (Universal Service
Cap) Bill 1999’, Canberra, 29 April 1999.
66 ‘Telecommunications Universal Service in Australia’,
ACA Media Release No. 1 of 1998, 7 January 1998.
67 ‘The universal service obligation cost’, Ministerial media
release, 12 October 1998.
final assessment of the Telstra claim, estimating
it to be $540 million in the absence of a cap.68 It
said that the difference between this amount and
the original Telstra claim of $1.8 billion was
primarily due to the ACA using a lower oppor-
tunity cost of capital and taking into account a
wider range of technologies. It also noted that
Parliament had capped the USO amount at $253
million.
The debate about USO costs did not stop at this
point. Further work undertaken by the ACA,
including another full round of industry consul-
tation, resulted in the ACA assessing the USO
amounts for each of 1998/99 and 1999/2000 to
be $280 million.69 This reduction from $540
million for 1997/98 was a consequence of re-
ducing technology costs and a lower opportunity
cost of capital.
Later, the ACA determined new USO subsidy
amounts to apply in USO contestability pilot
areas.70 In this determination the ACA assumed
the existence of viable competition, non-
exclusive access to the USO subsidies and there-
fore higher business risk.
Some 12 years after the BTCE was originally
engaged to estimate the losses incurred in
meeting universal service obligations, the USO
subsidy evolved from being a cost-based reim-
bursement of losses to being an incentive to car-
riers to supply services in a contestable market.
                                                      
68 ‘ACA final assessment of Telstra’s Universal Service
Obligation claim’, ACA Media Release No. 63, 22 October
1999.
69 ‘Government USO decisions break new ground’,
Ministerial media release, 23 March 2000.
70 ‘USO contestability pilot subsidies announced’,
Ministerial media release, 19 April 2001.
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Appendix 2: a digital data capability
In December 1996 the STSRG recommended
that:
The digital data capability should be provided
through the operation of the market throughout most
of Australia. Where the market does not operate to
make this capability reasonably accessible to all peo-
ple in Australia on an equitable basis, it should be
provided through the USO mechanism.71
In a dissenting report, one member of the Re-
view Group (Professor Henry Ergas) argued that
a digital data service should not be mandated,
due to the cost and lack of evidence of substan-
tial demand:
…the question must then be whether the likelihood
that the benefits which would flow from prescribing
the service would outweigh the associated costs . . .
the material advanced [in the Report] is clearly inad-
equate to the task. In effect the report greatly over-
states the likely benefits of prescription, while even
more greatly under-stating its costs.72
In response to these reports, the Government
chose not to include explicit reference to a digi-
tal data requirement in the Telecommunications
Act 1997, which defined the standard telephone
service as a service for the purpose of voice te-
lephony. This definition took effect on 1 July
1997. A 2.4 kbps digital data requirement arose,
however, from the ACA’s ‘End-to-end Network
Performance Standard’, which also applied as at
1 July 1997.73
Consumer pressure kept this issue alive, and in
1998 the Minister announced that the ACA
would conduct an official review into whether
the USO should be upgraded to include a digital
data capability.74 The ACA reported on its re-
view in August 1998, finding that any further
intervention by government in relation to the
provision of a 64 kbps digital data service was
                                                      
71 Standard Telephone Service Review Group, December
1996, p. 12.
72 Minority report by Henry Ergas, ‘Review of the Standard
Telephone Service’, Department of Communications and
the Arts, Canberra, December 1996, pp. 177-78.
73 ACA, ‘Net Universal Service Cost Assessment for 1997-
98’, AGPS, Canberra, October 1999, p56.
74 ‘Digital Data Review’, Ministerial media release, 6 May
1998.
not economically necessary or justifiable. The
basis for this conclusion was that:
ISDN or broadly comparable 64 kbps digital data
services will be accessible to all people in Australia
by the end of 1998 through Telstra meeting its
licence condition and its proposed satellite based de-
livery system.75
The Parliament then passed legislation requiring
Telstra to make a general digital data service (a
64 kbps ISDN-equivalent service) available on
demand to 96 per cent of the population. In
addition, Telstra and some other carriers were
required to make a special digital data service
(based on asynchronous satellite delivery) avail-
able on demand to the remaining 4 per cent of
the population.76
                                                      
75 ‘Digital Data Review’, Ministerial media release, 18
August 1998.
76 ‘Senate approves better rural phone services, consumer
protection and telecommunications competition’,
Ministerial media release, 22 June 1999
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Appendix 3: Networking the Nation77
                                                      
77 This summary is based on an address by David Williamson, General Manager, Networking the Nation, Department of
Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, to the Regional Communications Forum, Canberra, 14 – 15 May 2001.
 The Networking the Nation (NtN) program was
established as a $250m fund over 5 years begin-
ning in 1997/98. Its objective is to assist the
economic and social development of regional,
rural and remote Australia by funding projects
which:
•  enhance telecommunications infrastructure
and services in these areas;
•  increase access to, and promote use of,
services available through telecommunica-
tions networks; and
• reduce disparities in access to such services
and facilities.
An additional $171m in social bonus funding
was provided from 1999/2000 for initiatives
including:
•  the Local Government fund ($45m) to as-
sist local government authorities in regional
Australia to provide online access to infor-
mation and services including the Internet;
•  Building Additional Rural Networks
(BARN) ($70m) to promote ongoing, sus-
tainable improvements in regional tele-
communications services;
•  the Internet Access fund ($36m) to stimu-
late Internet service delivery in regional and
rural Australia; and
•  the Remote and Isolated Islands fund
($20m) to improve telecommunications ac-
cess for remote island communities.
The program is application-based and is de-
signed to respond to the telecommunications
priorities identified by communities in rural, re-
gional and remote Australia. The program has
funded a wide range of projects including:
• Internet services;
• mobile telephone services;
• community access facilities;
• telecentres;
• training and technical support;
• infrastructure planning and investment;
• electronic commerce; and
• videoconferencing facilities.
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Appendix 4: regulated contestability
1. Extended Zones tender
In March 2000 the Government invited com-
petitive tenders for a $150 million project to ex-
tend untimed local call access to all Australians.
Proposals were sought for the installation of new
communications infrastructure in the Extended
Zones, which cover 80 per cent of the Australian
land mass.78
In return for $150 million, and exclusive access
to the USO subsidies in the Extended Zones for
three years (set at around $35 million per
annum), the successful tenderer was required to
commit to providing untimed local calls to the
40,000 subscribers in the Extended Zones, while
maximising other benefits such as improved data
rates for the internet, additional services includ-
                                                      
78 ‘Call for tenders for $150 Million social bonus project’,
Ministerial media release, 23 March 2000.
ing television, lower prices and improved
quality of service.
If Telstra was not the successful tenderer it
could still choose to continue to offer services in
the region and to compete against the successful
tenderer, leaving the option open for contestable
supply of services.
2. USO contestability pilots
In March 2000, the government also announced
that it would undertake two regional contesta-
bility pilots,79 introducing competition into the
delivery of the universal service obligation as a
means of improving telecommunications service
quality and standards in regional Australia.80
                                                      
79 Regions on the South Australia/Victorian border, and on
the NSW/Queensland border – with USO subsidies worth
approximately $37 million per annum.
80 ‘Government USO decisions break new ground’,
Ministerial media release, 23 March 2000.
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The key elements of the USO Contestability
scheme are:
•  Telstra is the Primary Universal Service
Provider (PUSP), with the obligation to
provide the standard telephone service in
each area.
• Any other carrier can register with the ACA
to be a Competing Universal Service Pro-
vider (CUSP), delivering an Alternative
Telecommunications Service (ATS) in an
area. A CUSP can withdraw from an area.
• Telstra can register to provide an ATS in an
area.
•  An ATS does not have to include an un-
timed local call option.
•  A CUSP has an obligation to supply its
ATS on request to any customer in the area
in which the CUSP is registered.
• For each customer registered with a CUSP,
the CUSP receives a nominated USO
subsidy.
Customer demand is a key factor in determining
the commercial viability of a CUSP, as the
CUSP must offer an ATS sufficiently above
minimum requirements to attract a customer to
churn from Telstra. In uncontested areas, the
customer has no service choice and Telstra has
little commercial incentive to supply more than
the minimum requirements.
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Appendix 5: attracting competition into a USO market
A telecommunications carrier is unlikely to reg-
ister as a CUSP in a USO market unless it con-
siders it to be a commercially attractive oppor-
tunity. This is unlikely to occur when the USO
subsidy for the standard telephone service in the
area is less than the loss incurred in providing
that service.
In the event that there is no registered CUSP in
an area, the government can increase the USO
subsidy to attract a carrier to register as a CUSP.
This action would be based on the assumption
that the subsidy is too low to attract a new mar-
ket entrant and, as a consequence, Telstra is
funding an inequitable proportion of the losses it
incurs in meeting its PUSP obligations.
For example, assume:
•  a USO contestability market of 20,000
customers;
• a USO subsidy of $500 per customer;
•  a loss incurred in supplying the USO serv-
ice of $575 per customer;
•  total eligible revenue for Australia of $20
billion;
• Telstra with an eligible revenue of $15 bil-
lion (75 per cent of total);
• Optus with an eligible revenue of $3 billion
(15 per cent of total); and
• a regional telco with an eligible revenue of
$100 million (0.5 per cent of total);
then
• the USO credits for that market claimed by
Telstra will be $10 million;
•  the USO levy for that market for Telstra,
Optus and the regional telco will be $7.5
million, $1.5 million and $0.05 million re-
spectively;
•  the cost to Telstra of supplying the service
will be $11.5 million;
•  the net cost to Telstra will be $9 million
($7.5m + $11.5m - $10m);
•  the net cost to Optus will be $1.5 million;
and
•  the net cost to the regional telco will be
$0.05 million.
Now compare the following scenarios:
1. The USO subsidy is increased by 10 per
cent to $550.
•  this increase will cost Optus $0.15 million
(20,000 x $50 x 15 per cent);
•  the increase will cost the regional telco
$0.005 million (20,000 x $50 x 0.5 per
cent); and
•  the increase will result in a net benefit to
Telstra of $0.25 million (20,000 x $50 x 25
per cent).
This outcome will benefit Telstra and increase
the costs of all other carriers.
2. The regional telco elects to register as a
CUSP in the market before the subsidy is
increased to $550, and wins 5 per cent of
the USO market (1,000 customers).
•  there will be no change in Optus’ USO
levy;
•  servicing 1,000 carriers will cost the re-
gional telco $0.575 million (1,000 x $575);
•  the regional telco will claim a USO credit
of $0.5 million (1,000 x $500);
• the net increase in cost to the regional telco
will be $0.075 million ($0.575m - $0.5m);
• servicing 19,000 customers will cost Telstra
$10.925 million (19,000 x $575);
•  Telstra will claim a USO credit of $9.5
million (19,000 x $500);
•  the cost to Telstra resulting from the re-
gional telco entering the market will be
$8.925 million ($10.925m - $9.5m +
$7.5m); and
•  the net benefit to Telstra will be $0.075
million ($9m - $8.925m).
Scenario 1 might be preferred by Telstra (a net
benefit of $250,000 compared to $75,000) and
the regional telco (a net cost of $5,000 compared
to $75,000). Optus, however, might be expected
to prefer scenario 2 (no increase in costs com-
pared to a $150,000 increase).
There is therefore a commercial incentive for
Optus to encourage the regional telco to register
as a CUSP in the market to prevent an increase
in the USO levy. For instance, Optus could pay
$75,000 to the regional telco if it registered as a
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CUSP. In such circumstances, Optus would in-
cur an increase in costs of $75,000 compared to
an increase of $150,000 and the regional telco
would experience no increase in costs.
This cost sharing is similar in principle to that in
the USO arrangements, except that the cross
subsidies are negotiated directly between inter-
ested carriers without recourse to a cost-proxy
model or a centrally administered levy scheme
applied to all carriers.
A risk for Optus would be that the regional telco
would only register as a CUSP after an increase
in the USO subsidy. If, however, Optus could
negotiate a payment in exchange for transferring
its USO levy debit for the area to the regional
telco, then the commercial risk for Optus would
be reduced. The regional telco would want to
avoid the net increase in its USO levy debit that
would result if the USO subsidy amount were to
be increased. A pre-requisite for this would be
that USO levy debits are tradable.
The regional telco is in a unique position, as the
loss incurred in winning 5 per cent of the market
($75,000) is far less than the cost to Optus of an
increase in the USO subsidy ($150,000). The
reverse, however, does not apply. The loss in-
curred by Optus in winning 5 per cent of the
market ($75,000) is far more than the cost to the
regional telco of an increase in the USO subsidy
($5,000).
